Concordance (apportionment)
Concordance,[1]: 75 also called weak population monotonicity[2]: 147 , is a property of apportionment methods, which are methods of allocating identical items between among agens, such as dividing seats in a parliament among political parties or federal states. The property says that an agent with a strictly larger entitlement, should receive at least as many items.
Definitions
There is a resource to allocate, denoted by . For example, it can be an integer representing the number of seats in a house of representatives. The resource should be allocated between some agents, such as states or parties. The agents have different entitlements, denoted by a vector . For example, ti can be the fraction of votes won by party i. An allocation is a vector with . An allocation rule is a rule that, for any and entitlement vector , returns an allocation vector .
An allocation rule is called concordant if implies for all i,j.
Properties
All known apportionment methods are concordant. In particular, both Highest averages methods and Largest remainder methods are concordant.
There is a fine point with some divisor methods in which the divisor sequence starts with 0. For example, in the Adams apportionment method, the quotient of each agent whose current allocation is 0, is which is infinite. Therefore, if there are fewer items than agents, then the Adams method is, theoretically, allowed to allocate the objects arbitrarily, even giving more items to agents with smaller entitlements, which contradicts concordance. In practice, this seldom happens, as the number of items is usually larger than the number of agents. Formally, Adams' method is usually defined such that it returns an empty set whenever the number of items is smaller than the number of agents.
References
- Pukelsheim, Friedrich (2017), Pukelsheim, Friedrich (ed.), "Divisor Methods of Apportionment: Divide and Round", Proportional Representation: Apportionment Methods and Their Applications, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 71–93, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-64707-4_4, ISBN 978-3-319-64707-4, retrieved 2021-09-01
- Balinski, Michel L.; Young, H. Peyton (1982). Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote. New Haven: Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-02724-9.