Deportation of Americans from the United States

Deportation of Americans from the United States is the forceful expulsion, return or extradition of Americans to other countries after getting convicted of a common crime in the United States.[1][2][3][4] These individuals in removal proceedings include Americans by birth and legal immigrants that were naturalized under 8 U.S.C. § 1427 or admitted as nationals of the United States under the Child Citizenship Act of 2000.[5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14] As such, they can return to the United States at any time.[15][16][17]

Further information: Miscarriage of justice

Some have been placed in immigration detention centers to be deported but were later released.[18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25] "Recent data suggests that in 2010 well over 4,000 U.S. citizens were detained or deported as aliens".[26][27] These illegal deportations began occurring after U.S. President Bill Clinton had issued a presidential directive in which he stated the following:

Our efforts to combat illegal immigration must not violate the privacy and civil rights of legal immigrants and U.S. citizens. Therefore, I direct the Attorney General... and other relevant Administration officials to vigorously protect our citizens and legal immigrants from immigration-related instances of discrimination and harassment....[28]

Under 8 CFR 239.2, any officer mentioned in 8 CFR 239.1 may at any time, inter alia, cancel a "notice to appear" against any person who: (1) turns out to be a national of the United States; or (2) one that is not removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).[29] And under 8 CFR 1239.2, any Immigration Judge may terminate the removal proceeding of any person who turns out to be a national of the United States or one that is not removable under the INA.[30][16][6] A "notice to appear" that contains material false information (and/or omits a material fact) legally makes the entire removal proceeding void ab initio.[31]

Statutory, regulatory and judicial relief
Further information: Legal remedy

Any case that involves illegal deportation from the United States can be reopened and investigated at any time.[16][6][32][33][34] Not only from within the United States, the case can be reopened from anywhere on Earth.[35] In such cases, if one federal court of appeals becomes deliberately indifferent and refuses any service or a remedy then the victim may simply file his or her case in another federal court of appeals, until all the legal and factual issues are properly resolved.[36][37] Alternatively, a victim of illegal deportation may simultaneously take his or her case to the Supreme Court of the United States.[38][39]

Every "applicant for naturalization has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she meets all of the requirements for naturalization."[40] At the same time, the government "has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that, in the case of an alien who has been admitted to the United States, the alien is deportable."[41][6][29] A forceful and illegal deportation from the United States entitles the victim to seek a quick judicial relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and 28 U.S.C. § 2344.[37] The relief may include a declaratory judgment with an injunction issued against the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security requesting appropriate immigration benefits and/or damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) as well as under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.[42][6][39][43][15]

Physically removed Americans from the United States

A number of Americans have been placed in immigration detention centers to be deported but were later released.[18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25] Up to one percent of all those detained in immigration detention centers are nationals of the United States according to research by Jacqueline Stevens, a professor of political science at Northwestern University.[44]

The following is an incomplete list of Americans who have actually experienced deportation from the United States:

  • Pedro Guzman, born in the State of California, was forcefully removed to Mexico in 2007 but returned several months later by crossing the Mexico–United States border. He was finally compensated in 2010 by receiving $350,000 from the government.[45]
  • Mark Daniel Lyttle, born in the State of North Carolina, was forcefully removed to Mexico but later returned to the United States from Guatemala and filed a damages lawsuit in federal court,[15] which he ultimately won.[1]
  • Andres Robles Gonzalez derived U.S. citizenship through his U.S. citizen father before being forcefully removed to Mexico. He was returned to the United States and filed a damages lawsuit in federal court, which he ultimately won.[2][46]
  • Roberto Dominquez was born in Lawrence, Massachusetts. He was deported to the Dominican Republic. The government is unconvinced in this case as it claims that there are two people by the same name, both born during the same month and year. According to the government, both children were born to parents with the same addresses, and that one child was born in Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic.[47]
  • Esteban Tiznado-Reyna was born in Mexico to a father who had an Arizona birth certificate, which was found unreliable in an immigration court.[48] Tiznado was found not guilty of illegal reentry into the United States in 2008, but ICE still deported him despite the verdict. Documents were uncovered that the USCIS withheld in the 1980s, showing his proof of citizenship.[47]
  • Attiqullah Sayed Ahmadi, a resident of California, was admitted to the United States in 1982 as a stateless Afghan refugee under 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(2) and became an immigrant (and a green card holder) pursuant to section 1159(a)(2).[12] This process provided him with two independent lifetime protections against removability.[49][50][51][52] He was then naturalized as a U.S. citizen in the late 1990s in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) but forcefully removed from the United States in early 2000s on an inapplicable aggravated felony charge (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii)).[12][53][54] Mr. Ahmadi was represented by Vikas Bajaj, an attorney in San Diego, California.[12] Such deportations are not only in direct violation of the law of the United States but also in direct violation of international law.[55][6][56][28][57] As explained above, such illegal deportation cases can be reopened at any time and from anywhere on Earth.[58][16][37][32][33][34]

See also

Notes and references

This article in most part is based on law of the United States, including statutory and latest published case law.

  1. Finnegan, William (April 29, 2013). "The Deportation Machine". The New Yorker. Retrieved October 14, 2018. A citizen trapped in the system.
  2. Stevens, Jacqueline (June 2, 2015). "No Apologies, But Feds Pay $350K to Deported American Citizen". LexisNexis. Retrieved October 8, 2018.
  3. Olsen, Lise (August 2, 2017). "Hundreds of American citizens end up in deportation proceedings each year, immigration data shows". The New Yorker. Retrieved October 15, 2018. Hundreds targeted each year despite documents, claims, court data show
  4. "Some citizens being held as illegal immigrants". NBC News. Associated Press. April 13, 2009. Retrieved October 14, 2018. Dozens of Americans have been locked up or thrown out over past 8 years
  5. "Child Citizenship Act of 2000 ('CCA'), Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631 (2000)" (PDF). United States Congress. October 30, 2000. p. 1633. The amendments made by this title shall take effect 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to individuals who satisfy the requirements of section 320 or 322 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as in effect on such effective date. (emphases added)
    • "H.R.1593 - Adoptee Citizenship Act of 2021". U.S. House of Representatives. U.S. Congress. March 3, 2021. Currently, adoptees who were over the age of 18 on February 27, 2001, do not automatically acquire citizenship. (emphasis added)
    • "H.R.2731 - Adoptee Citizenship Act of 2019". U.S. House of Representatives. U.S. Congress. May 14, 2019.
      • "Pellegrino v. U.S. Transp. Sec. Admin., 937 F.3d 164". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. August 30, 2019. p. 180. Here, Congress has created a remedy; we are simply giving effect to the plain meaning of its words.
      • "Gomez-Diaz v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 913". Seventh Circuit. Harvard Law School. April 7, 2003. p. 915. The Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub.L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631, revised the manner in which children of non-citizens born outside the United States are eligible to become U.S. citizens.
      • "Belleri v. United States, 712 F.3d 543". Eleventh Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 14, 2013. p. 545. A child acquires derivative citizenship by operation of law, not by adjudication.
      • "Khalid v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 129". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 13, 2018. p. 138. [T]he derivative citizenship statute as amended by the CCA promotes 'Congress's remedial purposes' of 'keep[ing] families intact.'
      • "Matter of Fuentes-Martinez, 21 I&N Dec. 893" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. July 24, 2001. p. 896 n.4. A person who claims to have derived United States citizenship by naturalization of a parent may apply to the Attorney General for a certificate, but a certificate is not required.
      • Board Member Rosenberg, dissenting, ed. (July 24, 2001). "Matter of Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I&N Dec. 153" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. p. 170-71. Accordingly, in my view, 'as in effect on the effective date' clearly refers to the conditions that 'have been fulfilled' and exist now. No matter whether these conditions were met previously, or what the individual's status was previously, these are the rules that determine the person's citizenship status as of the February 27, 2001, effective date, i.e., now.
      • Judge Fernandez, dissenting, ed. (June 22, 2001). "Hughes v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 752". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. p. 760. As I see it, the language could be construed to allow coverage of individuals who had reached the age of 18 years before the CCA's effective date.
      • "United States v. Ashurov, 726 F.3d 395". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 12, 2013. p. 398. As the District Court recognized, 'such' means 'of the character, quality, or extent previously indicated or implied.'
      • "United States v. A.M., 927 F.3d 718". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. June 20, 2019. p. 721.
  6. "Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146 (2001)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 11, 2001. p. 153. The word 'shall' is ordinarily the language of command. (internal quotation marks omitted)
  7. "Immigration Library: Court Decisions". Greenberg Traurig. January 28, 2002. Retrieved September 30, 2021. Although the INS appears to have taken the position that the act is not retroactive, the language of the CCA's and Congress' intent have not yet been universally determined, and there may still be room for individuals to continue arguing in favor of its retroactive application....
  8. "U.S. citizen mistakenly put in deportation proceedings finally returns to America". NBC News. February 4, 2020. Retrieved September 28, 2021.
  9. "First Cambodian to return after deportation inspires others after gaining U.S. citizenship". NBC News. July 16, 2020. Retrieved September 28, 2021.
  10. "The first Cambodian deportee to return to the U.S. just became a citizen in Sacramento". The Sacramento Bee. July 3, 2020. Retrieved September 28, 2021. But what he's most looking forward to is getting a passport. Once the danger of the coronavirus pandemic subsides, he'll be on a plane. He'll even go back to Cambodia, just to remember and reflect on what he's been through.
  11. "Cambodian refugee who advocates say was wrongly deported returns to U.S." NBC News. February 28, 2020. Retrieved September 28, 2021.
  12. Thornton, Kelly (April 16, 2004). "Afghan immigrant sentenced to time served". The San Diego Union-Tribune. Archived from the original on October 3, 2018. Retrieved October 1, 2021. Man also will lose his U.S. citizenship
  13. "Ahmadi v. Attorney General, 842 F. App'x 777". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. April 7, 2021. p. 778. While Ahmadi argues that, under the Child Citizenship Act of 2000, he has derivative citizenship because his father naturalized after Ahmadi turned eighteen, we have previously held that the Act does not apply retroactively to people who turned eighteen before Congress passed the Act.
  14. Medina, Daniel A. (August 12, 2018). "Adopted and Undocumented". The Intercept. Retrieved September 30, 2021.
  15. "Lyttle v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1256". U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Harvard Law School. March 31, 2012. p. 1269.
  16. 8 C.F.R. 1003.2 ("(a) General. The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider a case in which it has rendered a decision on its own motion solely in order to correct a ministerial mistake or typographical error in that decision or to reissue the decision to correct a defect in service.... The time and numerical limitations set forth in paragraph (c)(2) of this section shall not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings:...
    (v) For which a three-member panel of the Board agrees that reopening is warranted when the following circumstances are present, provided that a respondent may file only one motion to reopen pursuant to this paragraph (c)(3): (A) A material change in fact or law underlying a removability ground or grounds specified in section 212 or 237 of the Act that occurred after the entry of an administratively final order that vitiates all grounds of removability applicable to the alien; and (B) The movant exercised diligence in pursuing the motion to reopen;
    (vi) Filed based on specific allegations, supported by evidence, that the respondent is a United States citizen or national....") (emphases added)
  17. 8 U.S.C. § 1503 ("Denial of rights and privileges as national")
  18. Amaro, Yesenia (November 22, 2021). "U.S. citizen spent 36 days in San Joaquin Valley immigration lockup. Now, ICE is being sued". The Fresno Bee. Retrieved November 23, 2021.
  19. Rosenberg, Eli (January 16, 2019). "A Latino Marine veteran was detained for deportation. Then ICE realized he was a citizen". The Washington Post. Retrieved January 21, 2019.
  20. Mindock, Clark (December 5, 2018). "Philadelphia-born US citizen detained by ICE and threatened with deportation to Jamaica". The Independent. Retrieved January 21, 2019.
  21. "ICE held an American man in custody for 1,273 days. He's not the only one who had to prove his citizenship". Paige St. John and Joel Rubin. Los Angeles Times. September 17, 2018. Retrieved October 15, 2018.
  22. "You Say You're An American, But What If You Had To Prove It Or Be Deported?". National Public Radio (NPR). December 22, 2016. Retrieved October 15, 2018.
  23. Hoffman, Meredith (March 8, 2016). "The US Keeps Mistakenly Deporting Its Own Citizens". news.vice.com. Retrieved October 15, 2018.
  24. Stanton, Ryan (May 11, 2018). "Michigan father of 4 was nearly deported; now he's a U.S. citizen". www.mlive.com. Retrieved October 16, 2018.
  25. Sakuma, Amanda (October 24, 2014). "Lawsuit says ICE attorney forged document to deport immigrant man". MSNBC. Retrieved October 20, 2018.
  26. Stevens, Jacqueline (September 22, 2011). "Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law" (PDF). jacquelinestevens.org. p. 608. Retrieved October 15, 2018.
  27. "UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS". Northwestern University. 2017. Retrieved October 15, 2018.
  28. "Presidential Documents: Anti-Discrimination" (PDF). Federal Register, Vol. 60, No. 28. U.S. Government Publishing Office. February 10, 1995. p. 7888. (emphases added)
    • "Zuniga-Perez v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 114". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 25, 2018. p. 122. The Constitution protects both citizens and non-citizens.
    • "Calderon-Rosas v. Attorney General, 957 F.3d 378". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. April 27, 2020. p. 385. The Supreme Court has explained that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings... because the Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent. (citations and quotation marks omitted)
    • "Serrano-Alberto v. Attorney General, 859 F.3d 208". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. June 12, 2017. p. 213. In other words, petitioners must receive 'a full and fair hearing that allows them a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on their behalf, and a decision on the merits of their claim by a 'neutral and impartial arbiter.' (citations omitted)
  29. "Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442 (2020)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 23, 2020. p. 1446. The umbrella statutory term for being inadmissible or deportable is 'removable.'
  30. "Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 462". Attorney General. U.S. Dept. of Justice. September 18, 2018. Immigration judges may dismiss or terminate removal proceedings only under the circumstances expressly identified in the regulations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(c), (f), or where the Department of Homeland Security fails to sustain the charges of removability against a respondent, see 8 C.F.R. § 1240.12(c).
  31. See, e.g.,
    • "Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021)". U.S. Supreme Court. Casetext.com. April 29, 2021. p. 1478. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009–546, requires the government to serve 'a notice to appear' on individuals it wishes to remove from this country. At first blush, a notice to appear might seem to be just that—a single document containing all the information an individual needs to know about his removal hearing.
      • "Rodriguez v. Attorney General, 844 F.3d 392". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 19, 2016. p. 399. Essential to the due process rights of a noncitizen permanent resident is that 'before his expulsion[,] he is entitled to notice of the nature of the charge and a hearing at least before an executive or administrative tribunal.'
      • "Pierre v. Holder, 588 F.3d 767". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 8, 2009. p. 776. We further conclude that the BIA's sua sponte invocation of subsection U as a basis for finding Pierre removable as an aggravated felon under section 237(a)(2) (A) (iii) of the INA violated Pierre's due process rights.
      • "Cantor v. Garland, ___ F.4th ___, No. 19-73085". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. November 3, 2021. p. 4. [T]he stop-time rule applies to only the two circumstances set out in the statute, and a final order of removal satisfies neither.
      • "Lazaro v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 977". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. June 4, 2008. p. 979-80.
      • "Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 9, 2003. p. 884.
        • "Matter of M-F-O-, 28 I&N Dec. 408". Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. November 4, 2021. p. 416. Accordingly, the court reasoned that a respondent accrues physical presence for purposes of section 240B(b)(1)(A) from the moment he enters the United States until he is served with a single document providing him with all the information required by section 239(a) of the Act. We agree with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and will apply it nationwide.
  32. "Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13 (2017)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. November 8, 2017. p. 20 n.9. In determining whether Congress intended [§ 1252(b)(1)] to be jurisdictional, we consider context, including this Court's interpretations of similar provisions in many years past, as probative of Congress' intent... we have made plain that most statutory time bars are nonjurisdictional. (brackets, citations and quotation marks omitted)
    • "Wallace v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI, 2 F.4th 133". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. June 22, 2021. p. 143-44. Equitable tolling applies when a petitioner has been prevented in 'some extraordinary way' from timely filing and has 'exercised reasonable diligence' in bringing the claims.
    • "Balbuena v. Sullivan, 980 F.3d 619". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. August 17, 2020. p. 638. Under Rule 60(b), a party may seek relief from a final judgment under limited circumstances, including fraud, mistake, newly discovered evidence, or any other reason that justifies relief.
    • "Baxter v. Bressman, 874 F.3d 142". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. October 18, 2017. p. 149. Rule 60 has no applicability where, as here, a party requests relief from a final judgment in response to an opponent's alleged fraud on the court.
    • "Luna v. Bell, 887 F.3d 290". Sixth Circuit. Harvard Law School. April 5, 2018. p. 294. Under Rule 60(b)(2), a party may request relief because of 'newly discovered evidence.' The movant needs to show by clear and convincing evidence (1) that it exercised due diligence to obtain the evidence and (2) that the evidence is material, i.e., would have clearly resulted in a different outcome.
    • "United States v. Handy, No. 18-3086". Tenth Circuit. Casetext.com. July 18, 2018. p. 5. [W]hen Rule 60(b)(4) is applicable, 'relief is not a discretionary matter; it is mandatory.' And the rule 'is not subject to any time limitation.' (citation omitted)
    • "United States v. Sierra, No. 17-12418". Eleventh Circuit. Casetext.com. January 29, 2018. p. 6-7.
    • Hague, David R. (March 2016). "Fraud on the Court and Abusive Discovery, 16 Nev. L.J. 707 (2016)". Nevada Law Journal. William S. Boyd School of Law. 16 (2): 725.
    • "Howell v. Superintendent Albion SCI, 978 F.3d 54". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. October 21, 2020. p. 59. The overarching question in this case is whether Howell has made a sufficient showing of actual innocence to gain relief under Rule 60(b)(6) – relief that would serve as a gateway past the procedural default of his having untimely filed his habeas petition, thus allowing the petition to be considered.
    • "Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. February 13, 2014. p. 1134. A federal habeas petitioner can overcome a procedural default, including a failure to comply with the statute of limitations, by demonstrating actual innocence of the crime underlying his conviction.
    • "Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. February 28, 2011. p. 1047. A petitioner is actually innocent when he was convicted for conduct not prohibited by law.
    "Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897 (2018)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 18, 2018. p. 1906.
    • "Bibiano v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 966". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 19, 2016. p. 969. We join the noncontroversial holding—shared by the nine other circuits which have addressed this issue in detail—that § 1252(b)(2)'s venue provision is not jurisdictional.
    • "United States v. Calderon, 243 F.3d 587". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 1, 2001. p. 590. Venue is not jurisdictional....
    • "Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150 (2015)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 15, 2015. p. 2154. The INA, in combination with a statute cross-referenced there, gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction to review 'final order[s] of removal.'
    • "Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. March 23, 2020. p. 1072. The statutory history and precedent, as well as the legislative history, thus support the conclusion that the statutory term 'questions of law' includes the application of a legal standard to established facts.
  38. See, e.g.,
  39. "Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. November 27, 2001. p. 74. [I]njunctive relief has long been recognized as the proper means for preventing entities from acting unconstitutionally.
    • Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, ed. (July 3, 2014). "Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. p. 2810. Under our precedents, '[a]n injunction is appropriate only if (1) it is necessary or appropriate in aid of our jurisdiction, and (2) the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear.'
    • "Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 22, 2009. p. 428. When a court employs 'the extraordinary remedy of injunction,' Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982), it directs the conduct of a party, and does so with the backing of its full coercive powers.
    • Chief Justice Roberts, in chambers, ed. (September 30, 2010). "Lux v. Rodrigues, 561 U.S. 1306 (2010)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. p. 1307. To obtain injunctive relief from a Circuit Justice, an applicant must demonstrate that the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear. (citation and quotation marks omitted)
  40. "Saliba v. Attorney General, 828 F.3d 182". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 8, 2016. p. 189. (quotation marks omitted)
    • "Ricketts v. Attorney General, 897 F.3d 491". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 30, 2018. p. 492. When an alien faces removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act, one potential defense is that the alien is not an alien at all but is actually a national of the United States.
    • "Khalid v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 129". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 13, 2018. p. 138. [T]here is a long-standing presumption that in the immigration context, we construe any lingering ambiguities in favor of the petitioner. (quotation marks omitted)
    • "Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 782 F.3d 9". D.C. Circuit. Harvard Law School. April 3, 2015. p. 15. The sole such statutory provision that presently confers United States nationality upon non-citizens is 8 U.S.C. § 1408.
      • "Robertson-Dewar v. Mukasey, 599 F. Supp. 2d 772". U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Harvard Law School. February 25, 2009. p. 779 n.3. The Immigration and Nationality Act defines naturalization as 'conferring of nationality of a state upon a person after birth, by any means whatsoever.'
  41. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A)
    • 8 CFR 1240.8(a) ("A respondent charged with deportability shall be found to be removable if the Service proves by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is deportable as charged.")
    • 8 CFR 1240.46(a) ("A determination of deportability shall not be valid unless it is found by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true.")
    • "Rumierz v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 31". First Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 3, 2006. p. 36. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a provides that the burden of proof is on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that, in the case of an alien who has been lawfully admitted to the United States, the alien is deportable.
    • "Berenyi v. District Director, INS, 385 U.S. 630 (1967)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. January 23, 1967. p. 636. When the Government seeks to strip a person of citizenship already acquired, or deport a resident alien and send him from our shores, it carries the heavy burden of proving its case by 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.' (footnotes omitted)
    • "Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. December 12, 1966. p. 286. We hold that no deportation order may be entered unless it is found by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true.
    • "Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. November 14, 1960. pp. 353–56.
      • "Matter of Pichardo, 21 I&N Dec. 330" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. April 23, 1996. p. 333. In fact, this conviction may support a finding of deportability under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act, but only if the record contains clear, unequivocal, and convincing proof that possession of a firearm was an integral element of the offense that the respondent was convicted of committing.... In other words, the evidence of record must establish that the respondent was, in fact, convicted of criminally possessing a firearm within the meaning of section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act.
      • "Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 15, 2015. p. 417. We ... hold that 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing' is the familiar intermediate standard used in civil cases when particularly important individual interests are at stake.
      • "Ward v. Holder, 733 F.3d 601". Sixth Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 15, 2013. p. 605. In addition to the Ninth Circuit and our Circuit, the First, and the Fifth Circuits have faced the same fact pattern and have held that the government must prove inadmissibility by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.
      • "United States v. Thompson-Riviere, 561 F.3d 345". Fourth Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 26, 2009. p. 349. To convict him of this offense, the government bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (inter alia) he is an 'alien,'
      • "Francis v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 131". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 27, 2006. p. 138. In this case, however, because Francis is a permanent resident, the government bears the burden of proof, which it must meet by adducing 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true.'
  42. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) ("Judicial review ... is governed only by chapter 158 of title 28, except as provided in subsection (b)....") (emphasis added); 28 U.S.C. § 2344 ("The petition shall contain a concise statement of—(1) the nature of the proceedings as to which review is sought; (2) the facts on which venue is based; (3) the grounds on which relief is sought; and (4) the relief prayed.") (emphasis added)
    • "Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020)". U.S. Supreme Court. Casetext.com. December 10, 2020. p. 492. A damages remedy is not just 'appropriate' relief as viewed through the lens of suits against Government employees. It is also the only form of relief that can remedy some RFRA violations.
    • "Cheneau v. Garland, No. 15-70636". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. May 18, 2021. p. 3. Cheneau is a citizen of the United States. Accordingly, we GRANT the petition for review, VACATE the BIA's decision, and REMAND with instructions to terminate Cheneau's removal proceedings.
    • "Addo v. Barr, 982 F.3d 1263". Tenth Circuit. Casetext.com. December 14, 2020. p. 1268 n.4. We note that Petitioner's removal has not mooted his petition for review because, 'in the event this court grants his petition, [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] would facilitate his return to the United States pursuant to its Facilitation of Return Policy.'
    • "Singh v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Services, 878 F.3d 441". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 22, 2017. p. 443. The government conceded that Singh's removal was improper given the Ninth Circuit's stay. Consequently, in May 2007, Singh was temporarily paroled back into the United States by the Attorney General, who exercised his discretion to grant temporary-parole to certain aliens.
    • "Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 12, 2016. pp. 589–90.
    • "Orabi v. Attorney General, 738 F.3d 535". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. January 2, 2014. p. 543. The judgment of the BIA will therefore be reversed, with instructions that the Government, pursuant to its August 12, 2013 letter, be directed to return Orabi to the United States in accordance with the ICE regulations cited.
      • "Avalos-Palma v. United States, Civil Action No. 13-5481(FLW)". U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. Casetext.com. July 16, 2014. p. 3. On June 2, 2012, approximately 42 months after the improper deportation, ICE agents effectuated Avalos-Palma's return to the United States.
        • "In re Vikramjeet Sidhu, A044 238 062". Board of Immigration Appeals. Scribd. November 30, 2011. p. 1-2. As related in his brief on appeal, the respondent was physically removed from the United States in June 2004, but subsequently returned to this country under a grant of humanitarian parole.... Accordingly, the proceedings will be terminated.
  44. Raney, Adam (June 15, 2014). "When the US deports its own citizens". Aljazeera. Retrieved December 4, 2020.
  45. "Peter Guzman and Maria Carbajal v. United States, CV08-01327 GHK (SSx)" (PDF). U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. www.courtlistener.com. June 7, 2010. p. 3. Retrieved October 20, 2018.
  46. Yu Hsi Lee Ju, Esther (June 4, 2015). "What One Man Did When He Was Accidentally Deported To Mexico". ThinkProgress. Retrieved October 8, 2018.
  47. "US Citizens Detained and Deported: Deportation Research Clinic - Northwestern University". deportation-research.buffett.northwestern.edu. Retrieved December 4, 2020.
  48. Raney, Adam. "When the US deports its own citizens". www.aljazeera.com. Retrieved December 4, 2020.
  49. "Romanishyn v. Attorney General, 455 F.3d 175". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 20, 2006. p. 185. That the INA addresses termination of refugee status in only one provision—8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4)—might suggest, as Mr. Romanishyn argues, that refugee status persists indefinitely unless it is terminated pursuant to that provision. (emphasis added)
    • "Reznik v. U.S. Department of Justice, INS, 901 F. Supp. 188". U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Harvard Law School. March 28, 1995. p. 193. Congress granted the President and Attorney General wide discretion in determining the admission of refugees to the United States.
      • "Matter of B-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 119" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. May 3, 2013. p. 120 n.2. Section 101(a)(42) of the Act provides in pertinent part: The term 'refugee' means (A) any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .
  50. "Matter of C-A-S-D-, 27 I&N Dec. 692". Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. November 1, 2019. p. 694. Section 209(c) of the Act provides that the Attorney General may waive certain criminal grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a) of the Act 'with respect to such an alien for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest.' (emphasis added)
    • "Matter of H-N-, 22 I&N Dec. 1039" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. October 13, 1999. p. 1040. Pursuant to section 209 of the Act, an alien admitted into the United States as a refugee under section 207 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1994 & Supp. II 1996), may have his or her status adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident. In making such a determination, it is clear from the statute that the Attorney General has the power to grant a waiver of inadmissibility to an alien who may be inadmissible. (emphases added)
      • "City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. July 1, 1985. p. 439. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.
  51. 8 U.S.C. § 1181(c) ("The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to an alien whom the Attorney General admits to the United States under section 1157 of this title.")
    • "Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (2012)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. March 28, 2012. p. 263. An alien seeking 'admission' to the United States is subject to various requirements, see, e.g., § 1181(a), and cannot gain entry if she is deemed 'inadmissible' on any of the numerous grounds set out in the immigration statutes, see § 1182.
  52. "Matter of N-V-G-, 28 I&N Dec. 380". Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. September 17, 2021. A person who enters the United States as a refugee and later adjusts in the United States to lawful permanent resident status is not precluded from establishing eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2018), based on a conviction for an aggravated felony, because he or she has not 'previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence' under that provision.
    • "Matter of J-H-J-, 26 I&N Dec. 563" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. May 12, 2015. An alien who adjusted status in the United States, and who has not entered as a lawful permanent resident, is not barred from establishing eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012), as a result of an aggravated felony conviction.
    • "Matter of Michel, 21 I&N Dec. 1101" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. January 30, 1998. An alien who has not previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence is statutorily eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)), despite his conviction for an aggravated felony.
      • "De Leon v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1224". Tenth Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 22, 2015. p. 1232. Mr. Obregon next claims that even if he is removable, he should nevertheless have been afforded the opportunity to apply for a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Under controlling precedent from our court and the BIA's recent decision in Matter of J-H-J- he is correct.
      • "Sambare v. Attorney General, 925 F.3d 124". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. May 28, 2019. p. 126. In October 2013, however, an Immigration Court granted Sambare's application for a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) and thus restored his status as a lawful permanent resident.
      • "Zamora v. Attorney General, 633 F. App'x 570". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 11, 2015. p. 573.
  53. "United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, 912 F.3d 1215". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. January 10, 2019. p. 1224. In sum, the Supreme Court has held that courts must consider both a crime's statutory elements and sentencing factors when determining whether an offense is 'punishable' by a certain term of imprisonment.
    • "United States v. McAdory, 935 F.3d 838". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 28, 2019. p. 844. None of McAdory's prior convictions had standard sentencing ranges exceeding one year, nor were any accompanied by written findings of any of the statutory factors that would justify an upward departure. Thus, the district court convicted McAdory under § 922(g)(1) even though he had no predicate offenses within the meaning of the statute.
    • "United States v. Williams, 5 F.4th 973". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. July 16, 2021. The panel held that the Washington offense of theft from a vulnerable adult in the second degree was not 'punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year' when the statutory maximum sentence exceeded one year but the maximum sentence allowed under the State's mandatory sentencing guidelines did not. Accordingly, the district court erred in determining that the defendant committed a Grade B supervised release violation.
    • "United States v. Hisey, ___ F.4th ___, No. 20-3106". Tenth Circuit. Casetext.com. September 14, 2021. We reverse, concluding that Mr. Hisey has overcome the procedural default by showing actual innocence. He did not commit the underlying offense (unlawfully possessing firearms after a felony conviction) because he had no prior conviction punishable by more than a year in prison.
    • "United States v. Haltiwanger, 637 F.3d 881". Eighth Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 25, 2011. p. 884.
  54. "Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 22, 2017. p. 1924. Maslenjak argues that the relationship must be 'causal' in kind: A person 'procures' her naturalization 'contrary to law,' she contends, only if a predicate crime in some way 'contribut[ed]' to her gaining citizenship.... By contrast, the Government proposes a basically chronological link: Section 1425(a), it urges, 'punishes the commission of other violations of law in the course of procuring naturalization'-even if the illegality could not have had any effect on the naturalization decision.... We conclude that Maslenjak has the better of this argument.
  55. "Article 3". Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. No State Party shall expel, return ('refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
  56. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-249 (Chapter 13 — Civil Rights)
    • "United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. March 31, 1997. p. 264. Section 242 is a Reconstruction Era civil rights statute making it criminal to act (1) 'willfully' and (2) under color of law (3) to deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
    • "Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 27, 2002. p. 739. Officers sued in a civil action for damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 have the same right to fair notice as do defendants charged with the criminal offense defined in 18 U. S. C. §242.
      • "United States v. Acosta, 470 F.3d 132". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 30, 2006. p. 136. Section 241 proscribes conspiracies that seek to 'injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person' in connection with exercising or enjoying constitutional rights.
  57. "Deprivation Of Rights Under Color Of Law". U.S. Dept. of Justice. May 31, 2021. Section 242 of Title 18 makes it a crime for a person acting under color of any law to willfully deprive a person of a right or privilege protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. For the purpose of Section 242, acts under 'color of law' include acts not only done by federal, state, or local officials within their lawful authority, but also acts done beyond the bounds of that official's lawful authority, if the acts are done while the official is purporting to or pretending to act in the performance of his/her official duties. Persons acting under color of law within the meaning of this statute include police officers, prisons guards and other law enforcement officials, as well as judges, care providers in public health facilities, and others who are acting as public officials....
  58. See, e.g.,
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