Tolling (law)
Tolling is a legal doctrine that allows for the pausing or delaying of the running of the period of time set forth by a statute of limitations,[1] such that a case may be reopened or a lawsuit filed even after the statute of limitations has run out.[2][3][4][5] Statutory filing deadlines are generally treated as nonjurisdictional procedural rules, which means they can be waived or the time to file a document can be tolled.[6] The only time this is not permitted is when the legislature has expressly indicated its intent in the statute.[7][5] Although grounds for tolling the statute of limitations vary by jurisdiction, common grounds include:[8][9]
- The person was a minor at the time a cause of action accrued.
- The person has been deemed mentally incompetent.
- The person has been convicted of a felony and is imprisoned.
- The person has filed a bankruptcy case triggering a stay of other lawsuits.
- The person is not physically within a certain jurisdiction (country, state, province, county, etc.).
- The person became a clear victim of exceptional circumstances such as deprivation of rights under color of law, fraud on the court, miscarriage of justice, etc.,[10] especially if the involved misconduct shocks the conscience of a common person.
- The parties were engaged in good-faith negotiations to resolve a dispute without litigation when the statute of limitations expired.
Tolling may occur under a statute, regulation or court rule that expressly provides for the tolling of the statute of limitations during specified circumstances.[2][3][4] It may also take the form of equitable tolling,[11][12] where the court applies common law principles of equity to extend the time for the filing of a document.[13]
Statutory tolling
When enacting statutes of limitation, legislatures or agencies may pass laws that describe when the limitations period may be extended.[14][2][3][4] The effects of tolling can be curtailed by a statute of repose, a law that creates an absolute deadline for filing a legal action, irrespective of reasons for tolling the statute of limitations.[9] Many jurisdictions have particular peculiarities with regard to tolling. For example, when a person files a legal action in Virginia and then declares a nonsuit, the statute of limitations is extended for six months.
Equitable tolling
Equitable tolling applies in criminal and civil proceedings,[11][13] which include all matters under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).[12] Equitable tolling is a common principle of law stating that a statute of limitations shall not bar a claim in cases where the plaintiff or petitioner, despite use of due diligence, could not or did not discover the injury until after the expiration of the limitations period.
For example, when pursuing one of several legal remedies, the statute of limitations on the remedies not being pursued will be equitably tolled if the plaintiff or petitioner can show:
- Timely notice to the adverse party is given within applicable statute of limitations of filing first claim
- Lack of prejudice to the defendant or respondent
- Reasonable good faith conduct on part of the plaintiff or petitioner.
It has been held that equitable tolling applies principally if the plaintiff or petitioner is actively misled by the defendant about the cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his or her rights. Importantly, it has also been held that the equitable tolling doctrine does not require wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant, such as fraud or misrepresentation.[12][15]
England and Wales
The term tolling is unknown to English law. Part II of the Limitation Act 1980 may permit an extension or delay to commencement of a limitation period where a party operates under a defined disability, in personal injury cases, amongst others. Also, where relevant facts of a cause of action for fraud or mistake have been hidden from a claimant, the limitation period will commence on the date that the person could have with reasonable diligence discovered it.
United States
Tolling is widely available in the United States,[6] expect in small number of circumstances where the legislature has expressly indicated to the contrary.[7][5] And even when a statute of limitations is waived, entitlement to any further relief must be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence.[16] If this cannot be demonstrated then tolling naturally becomes futile and a waste of judicial resources.[3][4] But if all requirements for obtaining injunctive relief are satisfied then a statute of limitations cannot be invoked by the opposing party or a court as an obstacle to such relief.[16][3][4][10][17]
Federal courts
Historically, the federal judiciary of the United States had "allowed equitable tolling in situations where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass."[18] The federal approach has been described as merging principles of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel.[19] Under standard application of those principles, equitable tolling does not require any misconduct by the defendant or respondent, while equitable estoppel requires wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant, such as fraud or misrepresentation.[20]
Before 2015, when the United States was a defendant, equitable tolling could not be applied against the United States since the Spending Clause has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to only vest Congress with the authority to waive sovereign immunity, and statutes of limitation are interpreted as a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity that limit the jurisdiction of a court to hear cases against the United States. In April 2015, the Supreme Court held that equitable tolling applies against the United States, despite the Spending Clause.[13]
State courts
Some non-federal courts in the United States take different approaches to equitable tolling, with some courts accepting equitable tolling and others sharply limiting the practice or declining to toll the statute of limitations in the absence of statutory authority.
Arizona
Arizona courts have recognized and applied the equitable tolling doctrine.[21] For example, the state's courts have allowed equitable tolling:
- When a second wrongful death claim was not filed in a timely manner after a successful verdict on first claim that was overturned on appeal due to defective service of process.[22]
- Where a plaintiff prisoner failed to timely file notice of claim against state because he first pursued claim through prison's administrative grievance procedure.[23]
- When a right-to-sue letter from the Arizona Attorney General's office contained incorrect date by which plaintiff was required to sue on his claim.[24]
California
The Supreme Court of California has held that equitable tolling may occur in carefully considered situations, as necessary to prevent the unjust technical forfeiture of causes of action, where the defendant would suffer no prejudice.[25]
Delaware
In the context of a case in which the defendants were subject to service by substituted service, Delaware's Supreme Court held that it would not equitably toll the statute of limitations due to the plaintiff's difficulty effecting personal service of a lawsuit upon the defendants.[26]
Florida
The Florida Supreme court observed, as an equitable remedy, the prejudice to the defendant must be considered before application of equitable tolling.[27] The court expressed that tolling doctrine is used in the interests of justice to accommodate both a defendant's right not to be called upon to defend a stale claim and a plaintiff's right to assert a meritorious claim when equitable circumstances have prevented a timely filing. The application of equitable tolling focuses on the plaintiff's excusable ignorance of the limitations period and on the lack of prejudice to the defendant.[28] Equitable tolling does not require active deception or employer misconduct, but focuses rather on whether the plaintiff acted with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.[27]
Maryland
Maryland does not permit the equitable tolling the statute of limitations, and tolls the limitations period only when the legislature has created an exception to its application.[29] Maryland's courts have held that the statute of limitations reflects a legislative judgment of what is deemed an adequate period of time in which a person of ordinary diligence” should bring his or her legal action.[30]
Michigan
In Michigan, the plaintiff must exercise due diligence in order to invoke equitable tolling. Where information is reasonably available to the plaintiff such that the proper defendant may be identified and served, the plaintiff may not seek the tolling of the statute of limitations due to its failure to obtain the needed information in a timely manner.[31]
Mississippi
Mississippi courts require earnest efforts by plaintiffs seeking tolling, and will not equitably toll the statute of limitations based upon claims of excusable neglect, or based upon the plaintiff's own actions or omissions.[32]
New Mexico
The Supreme Court of New Mexico has held that equitable tolling normally applies in cases where a litigant was prevented from filing suit because of an extraordinary event beyond his or her control.[33] In contrast, where a plaintiff fails to identify a cause of action and file a lawsuit in a timely manner due to his or her own fault, equitable tolling does not apply.[34]
North Dakota
In North Dakota, a plaintiff's failure to timely serve the defendants does not warrant equitable tolling.[35]
Contract law
In certain professional sports leagues, such as in the National Hockey League, the tolling of a player's contract to allow for the pausing or delaying of the commencement of a contract can occur under certain conditions when a player signs his first NHL contract. This tolling is defined as an "entry-level slide", which can occur for a maximum of two seasons. This is demonstrated in Exhibit 16.4 of the current NHL collective bargaining agreement.[36]
In addition, a player's contract can be tolled if a player does not satisfy his end of the playing contract (i.e., refuses to report while his contract is in force).
References
- "Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 30, 2005. p. 406.
We hold that the 180-day time limitation is more appropriately considered as analogous to a statute of limitations and, thus, subject to equitable tolling.
- 8 C.F.R. 1003.2 ("(a) General. The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider a case in which it has rendered a decision on its own motion solely in order to correct a ministerial mistake or typographical error in that decision or to reissue the decision to correct a defect in service.... The time and numerical limitations set forth in paragraph (c)(2) of this section shall not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings:...
(v) For which a three-member panel of the Board agrees that reopening is warranted when the following circumstances are present, provided that a respondent may file only one motion to reopen pursuant to this paragraph (c)(3): (A) A material change in fact or law underlying a removability ground or grounds specified in section 212 or 237 of the Act that occurred after the entry of an administratively final order that vitiates all grounds of removability applicable to the alien; and (B) The movant exercised diligence in pursuing the motion to reopen;
(vi) Filed based on specific allegations, supported by evidence, that the respondent is a United States citizen or national....") (emphases added)- "Bamaca-Cifuentes v. Attorney General, 870 F.3d 108". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 29, 2017. p. 111.
[T]he 90-day time bar (and restriction to file only one motion) will be waived for motions to reopen that (1) apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation that are (2) based on changed country conditions and (3) supported by material evidence unavailable at the previous hearing.
- "Silva v. Garland, 993 F.3d 705". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. March 30, 2021. p. 718 n.8.
We have held that these regulations also apply to claims under the Convention Against Torture.
- "Bamaca-Cifuentes v. Attorney General, 870 F.3d 108". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 29, 2017. p. 111.
- ("Judicial review ... is governed only by chapter 158 of title 28, except as provided in subsection (b)....")
- 28 U.S.C. § 2342 ("The court of appeals ... has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of.... Jurisdiction is invoked by filing a petition as provided by section 2344 of this title.")
- 28 U.S.C. § 2344 ("The petition shall contain a concise statement of—(1) the nature of the proceedings as to which review is sought; (2) the facts on which venue is based; (3) the grounds on which relief is sought; and (4) the relief prayed.") (emphases added)
- ("The petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.")
- ("The alien shall serve and file a brief in connection with a petition for judicial review not later than 40 days after the date on which the administrative record is available, and may serve and file a reply brief not later than 14 days after service of the brief of the Attorney General, and the court may not extend these deadlines except upon motion for good cause shown. If an alien fails to file a brief within the time provided in [section 1252(b)(3)], the court shall dismiss the appeal unless a manifest injustice would result.") (emphases added)
- ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall enjoin the removal of any alien pursuant to a final order under this section unless the alien shows by clear and convincing evidence that the entry or execution of such order is prohibited as a matter of law.") (emphases added)
- "Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146 (2001)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 11, 2001. p. 153.
The word 'shall' is ordinarily the language of command.
(internal quotation marks omitted)- "Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482 (1947)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. January 13, 1947. p. 485.
And when the same Rule uses both 'may' and 'shall,' the normal inference is that each is used in its usual sense—the one act being permissive, the other mandatory.
- "Dessouki v. Attorney General, 915 F.3d 964". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. February 14, 2019. p. 966.
[T]he word 'shall' imposes a mandatory requirement.
- "Orozco-Velasquez v. Attorney General, 817 F.3d 78". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 11, 2016. p. 83. (same)
- "Dessouki v. Attorney General, 915 F.3d 964". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. February 14, 2019. p. 966.
- "Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482 (1947)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. January 13, 1947. p. 485.
- "NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929 (2017)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. March 21, 2017. p. 939.
The ordinary meaning of 'notwithstanding' is 'in spite of,' or 'without prevention or obstruction from or by.'
- "Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. January 20, 2010. p. 238-39 n.1.
The introductory clause... simply informs that once the scope of the bar is determined, jurisdiction is precluded regardless of what any other provision or source of law might say.
- "Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10 (1993)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. May 3, 1993. p. 18.
- "New Jersey Air National Guard v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 677 F.2d 276". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. April 12, 1982. p. 283.
- "In re Partida, 862 F.3d 909". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 7, 2017. p. 912.
- "Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 3, 2013. p. 1083.
As a general matter, 'notwithstanding' clauses nullify conflicting provisions of law.
- "Jones v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 789". U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Harvard Law School. September 14, 2009. p. 792.
Congress' intent to override conflicting provisions of law is made clear through the plain meaning of 'notwithstanding.'
- "In re JMC Telecom LLC, 416 B.R. 738". U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Harvard Law School. October 5, 2009. p. 743.
- "Jones v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 789". U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Harvard Law School. September 14, 2009. p. 792.
- "Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. January 20, 2010. p. 238-39 n.1.
- "Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13 (2017)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. November 8, 2017. p. 20 n.9.
[W]e have made plain that most [statutory] time bars are nonjurisdictional.
(quotation marks omitted)- "Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 18, 1990. p. 45.
We have no authority to extend the period for filing except as Congress permits.
- "Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 18, 1990. p. 45.
- See, e.g.,
- "Monzo v. Department of Transportation, 735 F.2d 1335". Federal Circuit. Harvard Law School. April 6, 1984. p. 1336.
The statute provides in relevant part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any petition for review must be filed within 30 days after the date the petitioner received notice of the final order or decision of the Board.
(emphasis added) - "Fedora v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 848 F.3d 1013". Federal Circuit. Harvard Law School. February 16, 2017. p. 1014.
Because Mr. Fedora failed to timely file his petition for review with this court within 60 days after the Board issued notice of its final order, we dismiss his petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.
- "Monzo v. Department of Transportation, 735 F.2d 1335". Federal Circuit. Harvard Law School. April 6, 1984. p. 1336.
- McGovern, Bruce A. (Fall 2000). "The New Provision for Tolling the Limitations Periods for Seeking Tax Refunds: Its History, Operation and Policy, and Suggestions for Reform". Missouri Law Review. 65 (4): 1–80. Retrieved 5 September 2017.
- Larson, Aaron (4 August 2017). "Statute of Limitations by State for Civil Cases". ExpertLaw. Retrieved 5 September 2017.
- "Deprivation of rights under color of law". U.S. Dept. of Justice.
Section 242 of Title 18 makes it a crime for a person acting under color of any law to willfully deprive a person of a right or privilege protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. For the purpose of Section 242, acts under 'color of law' include acts not only done by federal, state, or local officials within their lawful authority, but also acts done beyond the bounds of that official's lawful authority, if the acts are done while the official is purporting to or pretending to act in the performance of his/her official duties. Persons acting under color of law within the meaning of this statute include police officers, prisons guards and other law enforcement officials, as well as judges, care providers in public health facilities, and others who are acting as public officials....
- "Federal Civil Rights Statutes". Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
- "Matter of O‑F‑A‑S‑, 28 I&N Dec. 35". Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. July 14, 2020.
- "Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 14, 2010. p. 634.
- "Wallace v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI, 2 F.4th 133". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. June 22, 2021. p. 143-44.
Equitable tolling applies when a petitioner has been prevented in 'some extraordinary way' from timely filing and has 'exercised reasonable diligence' in bringing the claims.
- "Wallace v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI, 2 F.4th 133". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. June 22, 2021. p. 143-44.
- "Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150 (2015)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 15, 2015. p. 2154.
- "Attipoe v. Barr, 945 F.3d 76". Second Circuit. Casetext.com. December 19, 2019. p. 80.
- "Nkomo v. Attorney General, 986 F.3d 268". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. January 21, 2021. p. 272.
- "Goulart v. Garland, ___ F.4th ____, No. 19-72007". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. November 18, 2021. pp. 4, 16–27.
- "Villegas-Castro v. Garland, ___ F.4th ___, No. 20-9593" (PDF). Tenth Circuit. Casetext.com. December 2, 2021. p. 6.
- See, e.g., "United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 22, 2015. p. 1629.
- See, e.g., ("Statute of Limitations")
- Leflar, Robert A. (1977). "Choice-of-Law Statutes". Tennessee Law Review. 44: 951. Retrieved 5 September 2017.
- 51 American Jurisprudence 2d Limitation of Actions § 174 (2007).
-
- "Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. November 27, 2001. p. 74.
[I]njunctive relief has long been recognized as the proper means for preventing entities from acting unconstitutionally.
- Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, ed. (July 3, 2014). "Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. p. 2810.
Under our precedents, '[a]n injunction is appropriate only if (1) it is necessary or appropriate in aid of our jurisdiction, and (2) the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear.'
- "Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 22, 2009. p. 428.
When a court employs 'the extraordinary remedy of injunction,' Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982), it directs the conduct of a party, and does so with the backing of its full coercive powers.
- Chief Justice Roberts, in chambers, ed. (September 30, 2010). "Lux v. Rodrigues, 561 U.S. 1306 (2010)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. p. 1307.
To obtain injunctive relief from a Circuit Justice, an applicant must demonstrate that the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear.
(citation and quotation marks omitted)- "Make The Road New York v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612". D.C. Circuit. Casetext.com. June 23, 2020. p. 635.
The Supreme Court has specifically held that Section 1252(f) does not bar declaratory relief.
- "Gonzalez v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 975 F.3d 788". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. September 11, 2020. p. 812-13.
Section 1252(f)(1) places limitations on the jurisdiction and authority of district and circuit federal courts to grant injunctive relief that restrains or enjoins the operation of §§ 1221–1232.
- "Make The Road New York v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612". D.C. Circuit. Casetext.com. June 23, 2020. p. 635.
- "Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. November 27, 2001. p. 74.
- "United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. March 31, 1997. p. 264.
Section 242 is a Reconstruction Era civil rights statute making it criminal to act (1) 'willfully' and (2) under color of law (3) to deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
- "Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 27, 2002. p. 739.
Officers sued in a civil action for damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 have the same right to fair notice as do defendants charged with the criminal offense defined in 18 U. S. C. §242.
- "United States v. Acosta, 470 F.3d 132". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 30, 2006. p. 136.
Section 241 proscribes conspiracies that seek to 'injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person' in connection with exercising or enjoying constitutional rights.
- "United States v. Acosta, 470 F.3d 132". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 30, 2006. p. 136.
- "Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 27, 2002. p. 739.
- "Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. December 3, 1990. p. 96. (footnotes omitted)
- "Seattle Audubon Society v. Robertson, 931 F.2d 590". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. April 26, 1991.
- "Abbott v. State, 979 P.2d 994 (1999)". Alaska Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 26, 1991. p. 997-98.
- "McCloud v. State, 217 Ariz. 82, 170 P.3d 691". Arizona Court of Appeals. Harvard Law School. November 9, 2007. p. 84.
- "Hosogai v. Kadota, 145 Ariz. 227, 700 P.2d 1327 (1985)". Arizona Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. February 20, 1985. p. 229.
- "Kosman v. State, 199 Ariz. 184, 16 P.3d 211". Arizona Court of Appeals. Harvard Law School. December 12, 2000. p. 186.
- "Kyles v. Contractors/Engineers Supply, Inc., 190 Ariz. 403, 949 P.2d 63". Arizona Court of Appeals. Harvard Law School. November 18, 1997. pp. 404, 406.
- "Lantzy v. Centex Homes, 31 Cal. 4th 363 (2003)". Supreme Court of California. Harvard Law School. August 4, 2003. p. 370.
- "Hurwitch v. Adams, 52 Del. 247 (1959)". Delaware Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. October 30, 1959. p. 252.
- "Machules v. Department of Administration, 523 So. 2d 1132 (1988)". Florida Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. March 31, 1988. p. 1133-34.
- "Cocke v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 817 F.2d 1559". U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Harvard Law School. June 2, 1987. p. 1561.
- "Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 333 Md. 324, 635 A.2d 394". Court of Appeals of Maryland. Harvard Law School. January 11, 1994. p. 333.
- "Ferrucci v. Jack, 255 Md. 523". Court of Appeals of Maryland. Harvard Law School. November 10, 1969. p. 526.
- "McMahan v. Dorchester Fertilizer Co., 184 Md. 155". Court of Appeals of Maryland. Harvard Law School. December 20, 1944. p. 159.
- "Ray v. Taft, 125 Mich. App. 314". Michigan Court of Appeals. Harvard Law School. May 3, 1983. p. 319.
- "City of Tupelo v. Martin, 747 So. 2d 822 (1999)". Mississippi Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. September 2, 1999. p. 829.
- "Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107". U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 11, 1984. p. 1110.
- "Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147 (1984)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 16, 1984. p. 151.
One who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence.
- "Ocana v. American Furniture Co., 135 N.M. 539, 91 P.3d 58, 2004-NMSC-018". Supreme Court of New Mexico. Harvard Law School. May 17, 2004. p. 546.
- "Riemers v. Omdahl, 687 N.W.2d 445, 2004 ND 188 (2004)". North Dakota Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. October 12, 2004. p. 454.
- http://www.nhl.com/cba/2005-CBA.pdf%5B%5D
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