Haldane Mission

The Haldane Mission of February 1912, was an unsuccessful effort to quell the friction between Britain and Germany arising because of their escalating naval arms race.

The mission by British diplomat Richard Haldane, 1st Viscount Haldane was a failure because Britain wanted a slowdown in the naval race and Germany wanted British neutrality a future war. [1] The negotiations were initiated by worried businessmen on either side, and continued by the British cabinet on the one side and the Kaiser and his top aides on the other. The collapse came when German insisted on a promise that Britain would be neutral and not join a country that started a war on Germany.

According to British historian John C. G. Röhl:

February 1912 is rightly regarded as a decisive event in the years leading up to the First World War. Seldom was the incompatibility between Great Britain’s balance-of-power policy of maintaining the status quo and the German Reich’s claim to the leadership of continental Europe so strikingly displayed.[2]

Political lineups

By 1912 the most critical issue threatening British-German relations was the rapid buildup of the German Navy. Britain heavily depended on the superiority of the British Navy for its own defense, and the rapid German gains toward parity constituted a major strategic threat. Secondly the Liberal government was committed to priority of social spending, and had a strong pacifist element that deeply distrusted heavy spending on the Army or Navy, typified by David Lloyd George. In the cabinet he confronted the civilian head of the Navy was First Lord of the Admiralty from 1911-15 was Winston Churchill, a Liberal at this time. Despite his love of naval affairs he agreed with Prime Minister H.H. Asquith and Foreign Minister Edward Grey that the only solution was to have Germany slow down its naval construction.[3] At this point two civilians entered the picture, and brokered negotiations. London financier Ernest Cassel was a close friend of both Britain's King Edward VII, and of Albert Ballin head of the Hamburg America Line, the world's largest steamship company. Ballin was a personal friend of the Kaiser. The Agadir Crisis had played out a few month before, leading to fears in Berlin that the British would side with France in any war against Germany.[4]

British draft proposals

A memorandum was prepared by Sir Edward Grey, Winston Churchill, and Lloyd George for the British Cabinet. Cassel brought the document to Berlin on January 29, 1912, where it immediately came to the attention of the Kaiser and his top officials. These proposals were:[5]

1. Fundamental. Naval superiority recognized as essential to Great Britain. Present German naval program and expenditure not to be increased, but if possible retarded and reduced.
2. England sincerely desires not to interfere with German Colonial expansion. To give effect to this she is prepared forthwith to discuss whatever the German aspirations in that direction may be. England will be glad to know that there is a field or special points where she can help Germany.

3. Proposals for reciprocal assurances debarring either power from joining in aggressive designs or combinations against the other would be welcome.

The main goal of the British Cabinet was the first item; the other two were concessions. The first item referred to the current German naval budget. London did not know that a new, much more aggressive proposal had been drafted in Berlin but not yet passed. The Germans gave Haldane a copy which he took to the Cabinet without reading. The second item was a concession; London was prepared to turn over parts of the old decaying Portuguese Empire. Berlin, however, had no interest in new colonies. Berlin focused its attention on the third item--it very seriously wanted British neutrality in a possible war. The German Navy under Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz had mobilized elite and popular opinion behind a new expansion of the Navy, and had just won the Kaiser's approval for its budget, despite the argument by the civilian government under Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg that considered it too expensive. Upon reading the British proposals, Bethmann Hollweg and the Kaiser were willing to cut the naval expansion to achieve it, despite the strong protests by Admiral Tirpitz. The Germans therefore invited a senior British diplomat and Haldane was sent, arriving on February 7 just as the Kaiser was announcing in vague terms the new naval budget that Tirpitz wanted.[6]

See also

Notes
  1. Robert K. Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the coming of the Great War (Random House, 1991), pp 790–817.
  2. John C.G. Röhl, Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900–1941 (2017) p 838.
  3. Bentley Brinkerhoff Gilbert, David Lloyd George, A Political Life: The Architect of Change 1863–1912 (1987) pp 66–68.
  4. Erich Brandenburg, From Bismarck to the World War: A History of German Foreign Policy 1870-1914 (1927) pp 383–386.
  5. "8 - 12 February, 1912 The Haldane Mission" The World War I Document Archive (1996)
  6. On German plans see V.R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (1973) pp 114–122.

Sources
  • Maurer, John H. (1992). "The Anglo-German Naval Rivalry and Informal Arms Control, 1912-1914". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 36 (2): 284–308. doi:10.1177/0022002792036002004. ISSN 0022-0027. JSTOR 174477. S2CID 154834335.
  • Scott, James Brown (1918). "Lord Haldane's Diary of Negotiations Between Germany and England in 1912". The American Journal of International Law. 12 (3): 589–596. doi:10.2307/2188240. ISSN 0002-9300. JSTOR 2188240.

Further reading
  • Berghahn, V. R. Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (1973), a modern German approach.
  • Brandenburg, Erich. From Bismarck to the world war: A history German Foreign Policy 1870-1914 (Oxford University Press, 1927), pp 394–417; older German perspective. online
  • Carroll, E. Malcolm. Germany and the Great Powers: A Study in Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (1938) pp 705–712, American perspective.
  • Cecil, Lamar. Wilhelm II (1989) online; scholarly biography
  • Cecil, Lamar. Albert Ballin : business and politics in imperial Germany, 1888-1918 (1967) online
  • Clark, Christopher. The sleepwalkers: How Europe went to war in 1914 (Penguin UK, 2012) pp 318–321. recent British perspective.
  • Fay, Sidney Bradshaw. The Origins of the World War (1930) 1:300-312, older American perspective.
  • Kraska, James. "Fear God and Dread Nought: Naval Arms Control and Counterfactual Diplomacy Before the Great War." Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 34 (2005): 43+.
  • Hinsley, F. H. British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey (1977) pp 193–215, British perspective
  • “Lord Haldane’s Mission to Germany: Important Official Conversations at Berlin in 1906 and 1912 Bearing on Issues of the War.” Current History (1917) 7#2 pp. 328–30, online, older American perspective.
  • Lynn-Jones, Sean M. "Detente and deterrence: Anglo-German relations, 1911-1914." International Security 11.2 (1986): 121-150.
  • Marder, Arthur. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: Volume I: The Road to War 1904–1914 (Oxford UP, 1961) pp 272–287.
  • Massie, Robert K. Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the coming of the Great War (1991) pp. 790–817, popular history
  • Maurer, John H. "The Anglo-German naval rivalry and informal arms control, 1912-1914." Journal of Conflict Resolution;; 36.2 (1992): 284-308.
  • Maurice, Frederick (1937). Haldane: The Life of Viscount Haldane of Cloan. Vol. 1: 1856 to 1915. London: Fabe and Faber. |volume= has extra text (help)
  • Röhl, John C.G. Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900–1941 (Cambridge UP, 2017), ch. 32 pp 833–73, online; recent British and German scholarship.
  • Seton-Watson, R.W. Britain in Europe: 1789-1914 (1937) pp 627-632.
  • Sleightholme‐Albanis, Elisabeth. "Sir Ernest Cassel and Anglo‐German relations before the outbreak of the First World War." Cambridge Review of International Affairs 4.2 (1990): 36-43.
  • Woodward, E. L. Great Britain and the German Navy (1935) pp 323–337, British perspective.

Primary sources
  • Churchill Winston S. The World Crisis 1911–1914 (1923) pp 94–99,online
  • Gooch, G. P., and Harold Temperley, eds. British Documents on the Origins of the War, Vol. 6: Anglo–German Tension: Armaments and Negotiation, 1907–12 (1930) pp 666–761. online
  • Haldane, Richard Burdon. Before the War (1920) online
  • Scott, James Brown. “Lord Haldane’s Diary of Negotiations Between Germany and England in 1912.” American Journal of International Law 12#3 (1918), pp. 589–96, online
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