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Liberal institutionalism (or institutional liberalism or neoliberalism) is a theory of international relations which holds that international cooperation between states is feasible and sustainable, and that such cooperation can reduce conflict and competition. Neoliberalism is a revised version of liberalism. Alongside neorealism, liberal institutionalism is one of the two most influential contemporary approaches to international relations; the two perspectives have dominated international relations theory since the 1990s.[1]

In contrast to neorealist scholarship which is skeptical of prospects for sustainable cooperation, neoliberalism argues that cooperation is feasible and sustainable. Neoliberals highlight the role of international institutions and regimes in facilitating cooperation between states.[2] Robert Keohane's 1984 book After Hegemony used insights from the new institutional economics to argue that the international system could remain stable in the absence of a hegemon, thus rebutting hegemonic stability theory.[3] Keohane showed that international cooperation could be sustained through repeated interactions, transparency, and monitoring.[4][5]

Terminology

Some call the school of thought rational functionalism instead of liberal institutionalism. Liberal institutionalism is also close to—but not synonymous with—regime theory and neoliberalism.[6][7] Robert Keohane, a political scientist largely responsible for the development of liberal institutionalism, considers his ideas part of institutionalism or rational institutionalism, even though those schools disagree with him on certain points.[8] Keohane dislikes using the adjectives "liberal" or "neoliberal" to describe his work because he also draws from realism, a school of thought that is often contrasted with liberalism.[9][10]

Liberal institutionalism differs from other common international relations theories like realism in the fact that it does not ignore internal politics. Furthermore, institutional liberalism follows the idea that democracy and capitalism create systems which not only maintain peace but also create beneficial economic opportunities for those involved. Liberal institutionalists believe that democracies naturally lead to peace because the many govern and not the few, and therefore those who decide to go to war will be the many that serve. This is in stark contrast to monarchies and dictatorships that are more warlike due to the fact that the few that do not serve will go to war. Beyond that liberal institutionalists defend capitalism on an international scale because they believe that if two nations are friendly, democratic, and capitalist the two nations will inevitably negotiate mutually beneficial trade deals.

Role of institutions

According to liberal institutionalists, institutions facilitate cooperation by:

  • Reducing transaction costs[11]
  • Providing information[11]
  • Making commitments more credible[11]
  • Establishing focal points for coordination[11]
  • facilitating the principle of reciprocity[11]
  • Extending the shadow of the future[11][12][13]
  • Enabling interlinkages of issues, which raises the cost of noncompliance[14]

Critics of liberal institutionalism argue that institutions do not overcome power politics; rather, institutions reflect power politics.[15][16] Realist Joseph Grieco argues that liberal institutionalist analyses omit that states pursue relative gains (rather than absolute gains), and that institutionalist analyses that focus on the issue of "cheating" ignore that the relative gains problem is key to why realists believe international cooperation fails.[16] Critics also argue that it is unclear whether institutions have an independent effect on cooperation or whether they reflect that the members are already willing to cooperate and comply.[17] Other critics argue that liberal institutionalist underestimate the enforcement powers of institutions: institutions are often designed to be weak to attract more members,[18] and they tend to be particularly weak on issues related to security rather than economy.[19]

Using logics from Historical institutionalism, John Ikenberry argues that institutions may be highly durable because

  • They strengthen expectations about future behavior
  • They build coalitions, routines and connections between actors, which creates incentives for continuity
  • They lead to spillovers, as other forms of cooperation builds around the existing institutions
  • High start-up costs prevent actors from setting up challenger institutions
  • Learning effects create incentives for actors to stick with existing institutions.[20]

See also

References
  1. Powell 1994, p. 313.
  2. Axelrod, Robert; Keohane, Robert O. (1985). "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions". World Politics. 38 (1): 226–254. doi:10.2307/2010357. ISSN 1086-3338.
  3. Keohane, Robert O. (2020). "Understanding Multilateral Institutions in Easy and Hard Times". Annual Review of Political Science. 23 (1): 1–18. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050918-042625. ISSN 1094-2939.
  4. Keohane, Robert O.; Martin, Lisa L. (1995). "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory". International Security. 20 (1): 39–51. doi:10.2307/2539214. ISSN 0162-2889.
  5. Norrlof, Carla (2010). America's Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation. Cambridge University Press. pp. 30–31. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511676406. ISBN 978-0-521-76543-5.
  6. David Baldwin (1993) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 10.
  7. Beth A. Simmons and Lisa L. Martin (2002) International Organizations and Institutions. In "Handbook of International Relations," edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, 192–211. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p. 195.
  8. Robert Keohane (1993). Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War. In "Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate," edited by David A. Baldwin, 269–300. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 273.
  9. Robert Keohane (1984). After Hegemony: Power and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 14.
  10. Robert Keohane (1993). Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War. In "Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate," edited by David A. Baldwin, 269–300. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 272.
  11. Keohane, Robert O.; Martin, Lisa L. (1995). "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory". International Security. 20 (1): 39–51. doi:10.2307/2539214. ISSN 0162-2889.
  12. Oye, Kenneth A. (1985). "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies". World Politics. 38 (1): 1–24. doi:10.2307/2010349. ISSN 1086-3338.
  13. Fearon, James D. (1998). "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation". International Organization. 52 (2): 269–305. doi:10.1162/002081898753162820. ISSN 1531-5088.
  14. Poast, Paul (2012). "Does Issue Linkage Work? Evidence from European Alliance Negotiations, 1860 to 1945". International Organization. 66 (2): 277–310. doi:10.1017/S0020818312000069. ISSN 1531-5088.
  15. Mearsheimer, John J. (1994). "The False Promise of International Institutions". International Security. 19 (3): 5–49. doi:10.2307/2539078. ISSN 0162-2889.
  16. Grieco, Joseph M. (1988). "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism". International Organization. 42 (3): 485–507. ISSN 0020-8183.
  17. Von Stein, Jana (2005). "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance". The American Political Science Review. 99 (4): 611–622. ISSN 0003-0554.
  18. Downs, George W.; Rocke, David M.; Barsoom, Peter N. (1996). "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?". International Organization. 50 (3): 379–406. ISSN 0020-8183.
  19. Lipson, Charles (1984). "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs". World Politics. 37 (1): 1–23. doi:10.2307/2010304. ISSN 1086-3338.
  20. Ikenberry, G. John (2001). After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars. Princeton University Press. pp. 23, 29–31. ISBN 978-0-691-05091-1.
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