Luna Torres v. Lynch

Luna Torres v. Lynch, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the definition of "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) encompasses a state petty conviction relating to section 150.10 of the New York Penal Law, regardless if the language of the state statute is missing, inter alia, the required interstate and foreign commerce elements.[2][3] An aggravated felony in the INA plainly and unambiguously refers to a past criminal conviction.[4][5][6][7]

Luna Torres v. Lynch
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued November 3, 2015
Decided May 19, 2016
Full case nameJorge Luna Torres, Petitioner v. Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General
Docket no.14–1096
Citations578 U.S. ___ (more)
136 S. Ct. 1619; 194 L. Ed. 2d 737
Opinion announcementOpinion announcement
Holding
Affirmed the Second Circuit, which deferred to the BIA's interpretation that a state petty conviction with one day of imprisonment constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(i), i.e., a conviction of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) with "not less than 5 years" of imprisonment.[1]
Court membership
Chief Justice
John Roberts
Associate Justices
Anthony Kennedy · Clarence Thomas
Ruth Bader Ginsburg · Stephen Breyer
Samuel Alito · Sonia Sotomayor
Elena Kagan
Case opinions
MajorityKagan, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Alito
DissentSotomayor, joined by Thomas, Breyer
Laws applied
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

The Court affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which found reasonable a determination made by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that an attempted arson conviction with one day of imprisonment constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(i), i.e., a conviction of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) with "not less than 5 years" of imprisonment.[1]

Under the INA, the number of days, months or years a person had to spend in an institutional setting such as a prison (as written in the sentencing guidelines sentence form in the record of conviction) determines if the conviction qualifies as a conviction of an aggravated felony or a petty offense,[8][6] and if an applicant for citizenship of the United States can be naturalized.[7] This was not mentioned or considered in this case nor in any of the previous cases involving section 844(i).[9]

Background
Further information: Aggravated felony, Petty offense, and Sentencing guidelines

George Luna Torres ("Torres"), a green card holder (lawful permanent resident) of the United States since childhood and a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was convicted in 1999 of "attempted arson" under section 150.10 of the New York Penal Law,[1] which states:

A person is guilty of arson in the third degree when he intentionally damages a building or motor vehicle by starting a fire or causing an explosion.... Arson in the third degree is a class C felony."[10][11]

"For a class C felony, the term [of imprisonment] shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed fifteen years[.]"[12][13][8] No fine of any kind is included. The court sentenced Torres to merely one day of imprisonment.[1] For purposes of U.S. citizenship qualification and the petty offense exception, Torres's sentence is one day of imprisonment,[7][8][6][13] and the "15 years" clock for becoming eligible to obtain cancellation of removal or a waiver of inadmissibility starts on the day Torres's petty conviction was entered in 1999. See below under the section: Opinion of the Court.

Seven years later, in 2006, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) placed Torres in removal proceedings, charging that his 1999 petty conviction is described by 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), which explicitly states the following:

Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years ... fined ... or both... and if death results to any person... to the death penalty or to life imprisonment.[14][13]

The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Torres removable from the United States as charged, which the BIA affirmed. Torres filed a petition for review with the Second Circuit. Under the well known Chevron doctrine, the Second Circuit, in an eight paragraph opinion, deferred to the BIA's reasoning that Torres's 1999 petty conviction was an aggravated felony conviction because it is described by the language of section 844(i).[1] In other words, it believes that a petty conviction not adversely affecting eligibility for U.S. citizenship is an aggravated felony conviction.[8] Section 848 expressly states the following:

No provision of [section 844] shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which such provision operates to the exclusion of the law of any State on the same subject matter....[9]

Opinion of the Court

Associate Justice Elena Kagan authored a 5–3 decision affirming the Second Circuit.[15] The opinion also emphasized on section 1101(a)(43)'s penultimate sentence, which in this case must be read as follows:

[Torres's 1999 petty conviction] applies to an offense described in [section 1101(a)(43)] ... for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years.[5]

In this regard, Justice Kagan recognized that "[t]he whole point of § 1101(a)(43)'s penultimate sentence is to make clear that a listed [conviction] should lead to swift removal, no matter whether [the listed offense] violates federal, state, or foreign law."[3][5] It is important to add that every offense covered by section 1101(a)(43) is in violation of the law of every country on Earth.

Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion, with whom Justice Thomas and Justice Breyer joined, basically explaining that the majority's opinion blatantly failed to adhere to the Court's prior views on statutory interpretation.[16] Both the majority and the dissent did not consider the rule of lenity in this case.[17]

For international law purposes, this case highlights persecution of legal immigrants and deprivation of rights under color of law. Also, clearly erroneous decisions of the Supreme Court are non-binding.[18][19] In this regard, the Court has expressly stated the following: "Our precedent is to be respected unless the most convincing of reasons demonstrates that adherence to it puts us on a course that is sure error."[20]

Notes and references

This page in most part is based on law of the United States, including statutory and latest published case law.

  1. "Torres v. Holder, 764 F.3d 152". U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 20, 2014. p. 83.
  2. SCOTUSblog coverage
  3. "Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. May 19, 2016. p. 1627.
  4. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) ("Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.") (emphasis added)
  5. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (emphases added)
    • "Bautista v. Attorney General, 744 F.3d 54". U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. February 28, 2014. p. 60.
    • "Matter of Vasquez-Muniz, 23 I&N Dec. 207" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. January 15, 2002. p. 211. This penultimate sentence, governing the enumeration of crimes in section 101(a)(43) of the Act, refers the reader to all of the crimes 'described in' the aggravated felony provision.
  6. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)
  7. INA section 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)
  8. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) ("[T]he maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted ... did not exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was convicted of such crime, the alien was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months (regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed).") (emphases added)
    • "United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, 912 F.3d 1215". U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. January 10, 2019. p. 1224. [T]he Supreme Court has held that courts must consider both a crime's statutory elements and sentencing factors when determining whether an offense is 'punishable' by a certain term of imprisonment.
    • "United States v. McAdory, 935 F.3d 838". U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 28, 2019. p. 844. None of McAdory's prior convictions had standard sentencing ranges exceeding one year, nor were any accompanied by written findings of any of the statutory factors that would justify an upward departure. Thus, the district court convicted McAdory under § 922(g)(1) even though he had no predicate offenses within the meaning of the statute.
      • "Matter of Serna, 20 I&N Dec. 579" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. October 14, 1992. Neither the seriousness of a criminal offense nor the severity of the sentence imposed therefor is determinative of whether a crime involves moral turpitude.
      • "Matter of Castro, 19 I&N Dec. 692" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. August 1, 1988. p. 694. The focus is now on what sentence was imposed, and not what punishment an alien could have received under the applicable criminal statute. (emphasis added)
  9. 18 U.S.C. § 848 ("Effect on State law").
  10. "Section 150.10: Arson in the third degree". New York State Senate. (emphases added)
  11. "Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. February 27, 2018. p. 855. The term 'or' is almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are to be given separate meanings. (quotation marks omitted)
  12. "Section 70.00: Sentence of imprisonment for felony". New York State Senate.
  13. "Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146 (2001)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 11, 2001. p. 153. The word 'shall' is ordinarily the language of command. (internal quotation marks omitted)
  14. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (emphases added)
  15. "Luna Torres v. Lynch, 578 U.S. ____, 136 S. Ct. 1619, No. 14–1096 (2016)" (PDF).
  16. See, e.g., "Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. January 26, 2004. p. 534. It is well established that when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms. (quotation marks omitted)
    • "Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 6, 2009. p. 314.
    • "TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. November 13, 2001. p. 31. It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant. (quotations omitted)
    • "NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 12, 1937. p. 30. The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy. We have repeatedly held that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the act. Even to avoid a serious doubt the rule is the same.
  17. "United States v. Santos - 553 U.S. 507, 128 S. Ct. 2020 (2008)". LexisNexis.
  18. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) ("A court may review a final order of removal only if—(1) the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right, and (2) another court has not decided the validity of the order, unless the reviewing court finds that the petition presents grounds that could not have been presented in the prior judicial proceeding or that the remedy provided by the prior proceeding was inadequate or ineffective to test the validity of the order.") (emphasis added)
  19. "House Conference Report on the REAL ID Act, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-72 (2005)" (PDF). U.S. Government Publishing Office. p. 174. Retrieved 2018-12-11. Section 106 of Division B would address the anomalies created by St. Cyr and its progeny by restoring uniformity and order to the law....
  20. "Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. January 21, 2010. p. 362.
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