Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA or IIRAIRA), Division C of Pub.L. 104–208 (text) (PDF), 110 Stat. 3009-546, enacted September 30, 1996, made major changes to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which the bill's proponents argued was mainly to counter the rapidly-growing undocumented immigrant population, and also to protect the legal immigrants and citizens of the United States.[2] "These IIRIRA changes became effective on April 1, 1997."[1]

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
Other short titlesIIRIRA
Long titleAn Act making omnibus consolidated appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1997, and for other purposes.
Acronyms (colloquial)i-RAI-ruh
NicknamesOmnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, "The Mexican Exclusionary Act of 1996":
Enacted bythe 104th United States Congress
EffectiveApril 1, 1997[1]
Citations
Public lawPub.L. 104–208 (text) (PDF)
Statutes at Large110 Stat. 3009-546
Codification
Acts amendedAntiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994
Immigration Act of 1990
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
Titles amended8 U.S.C.: Aliens and Nationality
U.S.C. sections amended
Legislative history
United States Supreme Court cases

In the IIRIRA, the U.S. Congress sufficiently protected all nationals of the United States (Americans) from deportation.[3][4][5][6] This important lifetime protection for Americans did not exist in the INA prior to 1996. At the same time, Congress expressly permitted the historical waiver of inadmissibility for stateless refugees and other legal immigrants.[7][8][9][10]

To drop the rate of crime in the United States, Congress tremendously expanded the definition of the term "aggravated felony" by entailing a great many more common criminal convictions "for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years."[11] Every "illegal alien" convicted of any aggravated felony is to be placed in an expedited removal proceeding.[12] This is due to the 15-year statute of limitations, which is consistent with "the Fifth, Eighth and 14th Amendments to the Constitution,"[13] including with the United Nations Convention against Torture (CAT).[14][8][7]

The IIRIRA combined "deportation proceedings" and "exclusion proceedings" into removal proceedings, which begin in immigration courts and in some cases make their way to the Supreme Court of the United States.[15][16] In exceptional circumstances, a person's removal proceeding can be reopened at any time and from anywhere on Earth.[15][17][18]

U.S. President Bill Clinton stated that the legislation strengthened "the rule of law by cracking down on illegal immigration at the border, in the workplace, and in the criminal justice system — without punishing those living in the United States legally." Some critics have argued that it punished U.S. citizens and noncitizens of all statuses "by eliminating due process from the overwhelming majority of removal cases and curtailing equitable relief from removal."[19]

Among other changes, IIRIRA gave the United States Attorney General broad authority to construct barriers along the Mexico–United States border, and it authorized the construction of a secondary layer of border fencing to support the already-completed 14-mile primary fence. Construction of the secondary fence stalled because of environmental concerns raised by the California Coastal Commission.

INA sections 101(a)(43) and 212(h)
Further information: Refugee Act, aggravated felony, and waiver of inadmissibility (United States)

IIRIRA placed "inadmissible aliens" and "deportable aliens" in a single group.[20] A legal immigrant can either be an American or a foreign national (alien),[9][10] which requires a case-by-case analysis and depends mainly on the number of years he or she has spent in the United States as a permanent resident (green card holder).[21][22][18]

IIRIRA expressly permitted the historical waiver of inadmissibility for legal immigrants admitted into the United States as stateless refugees,[23] even if they had been convicted of particularly serious crimes.[8][24][7][25] This finding is consistent with section 321(c) of IIRIRA and the penultimate provision of INA section 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).[11][26]

In section 321(c) of IIRIRA, Congress also expressly stated that the expanded definition of "aggravated felony" does not apply to those people who had already taken actions to violate the law (or were arrested for the offense(s)) before September 30, 1996.[27][22] To those individuals, only the pre-September 1996 definition of "aggravated felony" applies (regardless of the date of the actual conviction).[28][26]

In INS v. St. Cyr (2001), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress had not intended IIRIRA to be applied retroactively to all past criminal convictions.[28] The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) extends relief against deportation to permanent residents (green card holders) who had been convicted of an aggravated felony prior to April 1, 1997.[29][25] Doing that appears to be in harmony with section 321(c) of IIRIRA and the penultimate provision of section 1101(a)(43), which states the following:

The term ["aggravated felony"] applies to an offense described in [section 1101(a)(43)] whether in violation of Federal or State law and applies to such an offense in violation of the law of a foreign country for which the term of imprisonment was completed within the previous 15 years. Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including any effective date), the term ["aggravated felony"] applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after September 30, 1996.[11][30][31]

The part in the first sentence that states, "whether in violation of Federal or State law and applies to such an offense in violation of the law of a foreign country", in the above-quoted text, has no significance to the 15-year statute of limitations because the listed offenses under section 1101(a)(43) are naturally in violation of every law on Earth.[26] Some courts in the past have made wild and bizarre distinctions between local and foreign criminal convictions.[32] The findings and assertions of those courts constitute unreasonable dicta and deprivation of rights under color of law, which is a crime that entails capital punishment.[33][34]

IIRIRA's mandatory detention provisions have also been repeatedly challenged, with less success. The Reed Amendment (a provision of IIRIRA which excludes from the United States those people whom the Attorney General finds to have renounced American citizenship in order to avoid payment of taxes) also has been attacked as unconstitutional.[35]

In Zadvydas v. Davis (2001), the Supreme Court curtailed the government's ability to hold aliens in removal proceedings indefinitely.[36] A similar detention issue was addressed in Jennings v. Rodriguez (2018).[37]

INA section 101(a)(48)
Further information: Sentencing guidelines and Nunc pro tunc

Section 322(a) of IIRIRA added INA section 101(a)(48), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48), which applies to convictions and sentences entered at any time in history. There, Congress statutorily obligated the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now the U.S. Department of Homeland Security) to submit as evidence a certified copy of the advisory sentencing guidelines sentence form(s) in every case.[38][22] Failure to do that constitutes "deprivation of rights under color of law,"[33][34] which could lead to a gross miscarriage of justice,[16][39] especially in a case involving a stateless refugee that claims to qualify as a national of the United States.[18][3] A victim of such violation could have his or her case reopened at any time and from anywhere on Earth.[15][17] Such a victim may also become entitled to damages and a nunc pro tunc US citizenship so long as he or she qualifies.[40][41][42][3]

INA section 239(a)(1)
Further information: Notice to appear and Order to show cause

Section 304(a) of IIRIRA added INA section 239(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1),[43] which obligates the now U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to satisfy all of its requirements.[44] One of those requirements is to specify the aggravated felony from the list under section 1101(a)(43). Failure to do that is, among other things, a violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.[45] In other words, a "notice to appear" that contains material false information (and/or omits a material fact) legally makes the entire removal void ab initio.[46] There is at least one case in which an admitted 11-year-old stateless Afghan refugee under section 1157(c)(2) was separated from his biological U.S. citizen parents and returned to the war zone in Afghanistan without section 1229(a)(1)'s requirements being satisfied.[18]

INA section 240(c)(3)(A)
Further information: Removal proceedings

In INA section 240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A), Congress for the first time added the following two-sentenced statement:

In the proceeding the Service has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that, in the case of an alien who has been admitted to the United States, the alien is deportable. No decision on deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.[47][22]

Prior to the enactment of IIRIRA, the language of section 1229a(c)(3)(A) only existed in federal regulations.[47] The above-quoted statement of Congress is adaptation of immigration-related Supreme Court holdings from the 1940s to 1960s.[48] There have been cases in which the Service (now the Department of Homeland Security) has removed permanent residents of the United States without fulfilling its burden under section 1229a(c)(3)(A).[18][49][50][51]

INA section 240A(d)(1)
Further information: Cancellation of removal

INA section 240A(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1), was added by section 304(a) of IIRIRA to prevent permanent residents from obtaining cancellation of removal if they commit any aggravated felony before reaching 7 years of permanent residency (or 10 years of continues physical presence for non-permanent residents).[52] The BIA and the U.S. courts of appeals have confirmed that for purposes of cancellation of removal, the "stop-time rule" does not apply to any immigrant who had been convicted of a removable offense prior to April 1, 1997.[28][25] The same principle against retroactive application of new law equally applies to those who had already taken actions to violate the law (or were arrested for the offense(s)) before September 30, 1996, notwithstanding the date of the actual conviction. This finding is expressly backed by the clear statement of Congress in section 321(c) of IIRIRA and the penultimate provision of section 1101(a)(43).[27][26]

INA section 241(b)(3)
Further information: United Nations Convention against Torture and reinstatement of removal

INA section 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), was added by section 305(a) of IIRIRA mainly to restrict the removal of certain people to a war-torn country such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, etc., where there is constant sectarian violence and terrorism.[53] The chances of deportees getting seriously harmed in such unstable countries are obviously higher compare to others countries. All courts, including the Supreme Court, have confirmed that relief under section 1231(b)(3) and the CAT is mandatory.[54][14] This is especially true for those who have previously been admitted to the United States under section 1157,[23][8][24][7] including those who have already been granted asylum in the United States.

INA section 242
Further information: New Way Forward Act, Petition for review, and certiorari
Any person may take his or her deportation-related case to the U.S. Supreme Court

INA section 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252, was added by section 306(a) of IIRIRA to guide courts on how to adjudicate a petition for review and a petition for writ of certiorari,[55] which may include asylum claims, CAT claims, non-refoulement claims, United States nationality claims, gross miscarriage of justice claims, due process claims, persecution claims, deprivation of rights under color of law claims, deliberate indifference claims, equal protection claims, cruel and unusual punishment claims, fraud on the court claims, actual innocence claims, tolling claims, damages claims and so on.[41][14][56][2][13][3][16][39][57][58][40] By repealing the old pre-IIRIRA judicial review law, Congress made clear that all decisions relating to that old process must remain inapplicable to the new IIRIRA-created procedure under section 1252.[59][22] In other words, all pre-IIRIRA judgments and orders of removal, including the 1995 Supreme Court's holding in Stone v. INS about filing a petition for review,[60] have no relevance to post-IIRIRA orders of removal and cannot be used against any petition for review or certiorari filed under section 1252.[61][62][31] The reason for this social inequality is that those ordered removed before IIRIRA took effect were much fewer in number, and there was various forms of relief available to them,[29] even the ones who had been convicted of particularly serious crimes.[28] In contrast, those ordered removed in the post-IIRIRA era number in the millions and many of them had been convicted of minor offenses. The chances of wrongful removal to occur naturally becomes very high when such a large number of people are placed in removal proceedings, which include many legal immigrants (potential Americans).[50][51][4][5][6][63][64][18][24]

Regarding filing deadlines, Congress stated in section 1252(b) the following:

With respect to review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1), the following requirements apply.... The petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.... The alien shall serve and file a brief in connection with a petition for judicial review not later than 40 days after the date on which the administrative record is available, and may serve and file a reply brief not later than 14 days after service of the brief of the Attorney General, and the court may not extend these deadlines except upon motion for good cause shown.[65][22]

Section 1252(b) is in harmony with every other statutory and constitutional law,[66] and is perfectly consistent with Rule 26(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP).[67][22] The term "these deadlines" in the above-quoted text does not explicitly refer to only two or three deadlines.[26] Contrary to the various dicta of lower courts,[68] which directly conflict with the clear statement of Congress in section 306(c) of IIRIRA,[59][31] an order of removal can be reviewed at any time.[69][17][18] But there is always a catch to such relief in courts.[16] If the petitioner turns out to be a "national of the United States",[3] he or she would simply need to show to the court any of the following valid United States documents: a birth certificate; a certificate of citizenship; a certificate of naturalization; a passport; or any other evidence establishing United States nationality.[21][3] And if the petitioner is an "alien", he or she must fulfill the requirements of section 1252(f), which include showing to the court the "clear and convincing evidence" demanded by section 1252(f)(2).[70] Irrespective if the petition for review is timely or untimely, meeting the demand of section 1252(f)(2) naturally fulfills the requirements of every other rule or law in existence for relief purposes.[31][30] The reviewing court can then proceed to either grant or deny a petitioner's prayer for relief,[41] which in some extraordinary and exceptional circumstances may include transferring the case to a U.S. district court for a jury trial.[40] By starting with the clause, "Notwithstanding any other provision of law,"[71] section 1252(f)(2) is basically saying that declaratory judgment and injunctive relief are available to an alien (regardless what section 1231(a)(5) or 1252(b)(1) says).[72][30][71][31][26][66]

Section 1252(d)(2) literally makes it impossible for the reviewing court to ignore (and not adequately resolve) the legal issues presented in a petition for review,[73] irrespective if the petition for review is timely or untimely. Contrary to the dicta of the various lower courts,[68] if Congress wanted to make section 1252(b)(1) jurisdictional it would have added language similar to that of 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).[74][30][31] An act of deliberate indifference by the reviewing court could lead to a similar situation as that of George Floyd in 2020. For this reason section 1252 sufficiently prevents all court employees from depriving any individual of any legal rights.[33][34][13][2][14] In the event the reviewing court becomes deliberately indifferent or a violator of law, the petitioner can file a petition for review in any other court of appeals,[75] which may include a complaint against any previous reviewing court. Section 1252 (by its plain language) covers the universe of legal actions. In the meantime, the petitioner can also obtain declaratory judgment and/or injunctive relief under Rules 20 to 23 of the U.S. Supreme Court.[76]

INA section 287(g)
Main article: Immigration and Nationality Act Section 287(g)

IIRIRA addressed the relationship between federal and local governments. Section 287(g) of the Act allows the U.S. Attorney General to enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies, permitting designated officers to perform immigration law enforcement functions pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement. The Section does not simply deputize state and local law enforcement personnel to enforce immigration matters.[77] This provision had been implemented by local and state authorities in five states (California, Arizona, Alabama, Florida, and North Carolina) by the end of 2006.[78]

Higher education restrictions

Upon passage of this law, states were restricted from offering in-state tuition at public institutions to students who were not legally in the country.[79] Specifically, if a state allows undocumented immigrant students to be eligible for in-state tuition, then residents from other states must also be eligible for in-state tuition. Several states have passed tuition-equality laws by allowing anyone regardless of legal status to apply for in-state tuition if they meet the state's eligibility requirements.[80]

Voting
Further information: Child Citizenship Act of 2000

IIRIRA made it a criminal offense for a noncitizen to vote in a federal election.[81] This, however, does not apply to those who have resided in the United States as non-citizen U.S. nationals or permanent residents while they were under the age of 16 years, and both of their parents are U.S. citizens.[42]

Impact

A 2018 paper found that the Act reduced the health and mental health outcomes of Latin-American undocumented immigrants in the United States by escalating their fear that they would be deported.[82]

See also

Notes and references

This article in most part is based on law of the United States, including statutory and latest published case law.

  1. "Othi v. Holder, 734 F.3d 259". Fourth Circuit. Harvard Law School. October 29, 2013. p. 265.
  2. "Presidential Documents: Anti-Discrimination" (PDF). Federal Register, Vol. 60, No. 28. U.S. Government Publishing Office. February 10, 1995. p. 7888. Retrieved 2021-11-12. Our efforts to combat illegal immigration must not violate the privacy and civil rights of legal immigrants and U.S. citizens. Therefore, I direct the Attorney General... and other relevant Administration officials to vigorously protect our citizens and legal immigrants from immigration-related instances of discrimination and harassment....
    • "Zuniga-Perez v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 114". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 25, 2018. p. 122. The Constitution protects both citizens and non-citizens.
    • "Calderon-Rosas v. Attorney General, 957 F.3d 378". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. April 27, 2020. p. 385. The Supreme Court has explained that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings... because the Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent. (citations and quotation marks omitted)
    • "Serrano-Alberto v. Attorney General, 859 F.3d 208". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. June 12, 2017. p. 213. In other words, petitioners must receive 'a full and fair hearing that allows them a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on their behalf, and a decision on the merits of their claim by a 'neutral and impartial arbiter.' (citations omitted)
  3. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)
  4. "U.S. citizen mistakenly put in deportation proceedings finally returns to America". NBC News. February 4, 2020. Retrieved 2021-11-02.
  5. "Cambodian refugee who advocates say was wrongly deported returns to U.S." NBC News. February 28, 2020. Retrieved 2021-11-02.
  6. "First Cambodian to return after deportation inspires others after gaining U.S. citizenship". NBC News. July 16, 2020. Retrieved 2021-11-02.
  7. "Matter of N-V-G-, 28 I&N Dec. 380". Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. September 17, 2021. A person who enters the United States as a refugee and later adjusts in the United States to lawful permanent resident status is not precluded from establishing eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2018), based on a conviction for an aggravated felony, because he or she has not 'previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence' under that provision.
    • "Matter of J-H-J-, 26 I&N Dec. 563" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. May 12, 2015. An alien who adjusted status in the United States, and who has not entered as a lawful permanent resident, is not barred from establishing eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2012), as a result of an aggravated felony conviction.
    • "Matter of Michel, 21 I&N Dec. 1101" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. January 30, 1998. An alien who has not previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence is statutorily eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)), despite his conviction for an aggravated felony.
      • "De Leon v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1224". Tenth Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 22, 2015. p. 1232. Mr. Obregon next claims that even if he is removable, he should nevertheless have been afforded the opportunity to apply for a waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Under controlling precedent from our court and the BIA's recent decision in Matter of J-H-J- he is correct.
      • "Sambare v. Attorney General, 925 F.3d 124". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. May 28, 2019. p. 126. In October 2013, however, an Immigration Court granted Sambare's application for a waiver of inadmissibility pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) and thus restored his status as a lawful permanent resident.
      • "Zamora v. Attorney General, 633 F. App'x 570". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 11, 2015. p. 573.
  8. "Matter of C-A-S-D-, 27 I&N Dec. 692". Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. November 1, 2019. p. 694. Section 209(c) of the Act provides that the Attorney General may waive certain criminal grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(a) of the Act 'with respect to such an alien for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest.' (emphasis added)
    • "Matter of H-N-, 22 I&N Dec. 1039" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. October 13, 1999. p. 1040. Pursuant to section 209 of the Act, an alien admitted into the United States as a refugee under section 207 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (1994 & Supp. II 1996), may have his or her status adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident. In making such a determination, it is clear from the statute that the Attorney General has the power to grant a waiver of inadmissibility to an alien who may be inadmissible. (emphases added)
    • 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) ("The term 'immigrant' means every alien except an alien who is within one of the following classes of nonimmigrant aliens....")
    • 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27) ("The term 'special immigrant' means—(A) an immigrant, lawfully admitted for permanent residence, who is returning from a temporary visit abroad....")
    • 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(2) ("Any alien who is found upon inspection and examination by an immigration officer pursuant to paragraph (1) ... as an immigrant under this chapter....") (emphasis added)
  10. "Romanishyn v. Attorney General, 455 F.3d 175". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 20, 2006. p. 185. That the INA addresses termination of refugee status in only one provision—8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4)—might suggest, as Mr. Romanishyn argues, that refugee status persists indefinitely unless it is terminated pursuant to that provision. (emphasis added)
  11. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (emphases added)
    • "Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. May 19, 2016. p. 1627. The whole point of § 1101(a)(43)'s penultimate sentence is to make clear that a listed offense should lead to swift removal, no matter whether it violates federal, state, or foreign law.
      • "Matter of Vasquez-Muniz, 23 I&N Dec. 207" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. January 15, 2002. p. 211. This penultimate sentence, governing the enumeration of crimes in section 101(a)(43) of the Act, refers the reader to all of the crimes 'described in' the aggravated felony provision.
  12. 8 U.S.C. § 1365(b) ("An illegal alien ... is any alien ... who is in the United States unlawfully....")
  13. "Chapter 11 - Foreign Policy: Senate OKs Ratification of Torture Treaty" (46th ed.). CQ Press. 1990. pp. 806–7. Retrieved August 8, 2018. The three other reservations, also crafted with the help and approval of the Bush administration, did the following: Limited the definition of 'cruel, inhuman or degrading' treatment to cruel and unusual punishment as defined under the Fifth, Eighth and 14th Amendments to the Constitution.... (emphasis added).
  14. "Article 16". Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. [The United States] shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article I, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. (emphasis added)
  15. 8 C.F.R. 1003.2 ("(a) General. The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider a case in which it has rendered a decision on its own motion solely in order to correct a ministerial mistake or typographical error in that decision or to reissue the decision to correct a defect in service.... The time and numerical limitations set forth in paragraph (c)(2) of this section shall not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings:...
    (v) For which a three-member panel of the Board agrees that reopening is warranted when the following circumstances are present, provided that a respondent may file only one motion to reopen pursuant to this paragraph (c)(3): (A) A material change in fact or law underlying a removability ground or grounds specified in section 212 or 237 of the Act that occurred after the entry of an administratively final order that vitiates all grounds of removability applicable to the alien; and (B) The movant exercised diligence in pursuing the motion to reopen;
    (vi) Filed based on specific allegations, supported by evidence, that the respondent is a United States citizen or national....") (emphases added)
    • "Bamaca-Cifuentes v. Attorney General, 870 F.3d 108". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 29, 2017. p. 111. [T]he 90-day time bar (and restriction to file only one motion) will be waived for motions to reopen that (1) apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation that are (2) based on changed country conditions and (3) supported by material evidence unavailable at the previous hearing.
    • "Silva v. Garland, 993 F.3d 705". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. March 30, 2021. p. 718 n.8. We have held that these regulations also apply to claims under the Convention Against Torture.
    • "Nolasco-Amaya v. Garland, ___ F.4th ___, No. 20-70187". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. September 28, 2021. p. 5.
  16. "Vazquez v. Garland, ___ F.4th ___, No. 18-70329". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. November 12, 2021. p. 6.
  17. "Rubalcaba v. Garland, 998 F.3d 1031". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. June 2, 2021. p. 1034. [W]e conclude that the departure bar does not apply in the context of sua sponte reopening.
  18. "Ahmadi v. Attorney General, 842 F. App'x 777". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. April 7, 2021. p. 778. In 1997, when Ahmadi was 26, the Immigration and Naturalization Service instituted removal proceedings against him based on firearms violations and an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A) and (C).
  19. Kerwin, Donald (2018). "From IIRIRA to Trump: Connecting the Dots to the Current U.S. Immigration Policy Crisis". Journal on Migration and Human Security. https://doi.org/10.1177/2331502418786718: Center for Migration Studies. 6 (3): 192–204. doi:10.1177/2331502418786718.CS1 maint: location (link)
  20. "Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442 (2020)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 23, 2020. p. 1446. The umbrella statutory term for being inadmissible or deportable is 'removable.'
  21. 8 U.S.C. § 1408 ("Nationals but not citizens of the United States at birth"); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1436 ("Nationals but not citizens...."); 12 CFR 268.205(a)(7) ("National refers to any individual who meets the requirements described in 8 U.S.C. 1408.")
  22. "Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146 (2001)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 11, 2001. p. 153. The word 'shall' is ordinarily the language of command. (internal quotation marks omitted)
  23. "Posos-Sanchez v. Garland, 3 F.4th 1176". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. July 7, 2021. p. 1182-83. The INA generally defines the words 'admission' and 'admitted' as 'the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.'
    • "Matter of D-K-, 25 I&N Dec. 761" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. April 12, 2012. p. 766. With regard to refugees, the language of both the Act and the regulations states that they are 'admitted' to the United States.
  24. 8 U.S.C. § 1181(c) ("The provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to an alien whom the Attorney General admits to the United States under section 1157 of this title.")
    • "Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (2012)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. March 28, 2012. p. 263. An alien seeking 'admission' to the United States is subject to various requirements, see, e.g., § 1181(a), and cannot gain entry if she is deemed 'inadmissible' on any of the numerous grounds set out in the immigration statutes, see § 1182.
  25. "Board of Immigration Appeals". U.S. Dept. of Justice. September 14, 2021. BIA decisions are binding on all DHS officers and immigration judges....
    • 8 CFR 1003.1(g)(1) ("Except as Board decisions may be modified or overruled by the Board or the Attorney General, decisions of the Board and decisions of the Attorney General are binding on all officers and employees of DHS or immigration judges in the administration of the immigration laws of the United States.")
    • "Matter of Douglas, 26 I&N Dec. 197" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. October 17, 2013. p. 199. The [Supreme] Court has also emphasized that the Chevron principle of deference must be applied to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions, even where a court has previously issued a contrary decision and believes that its construction is the better one, provided that the agency's interpretation is reasonable.
  26. "Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. February 18, 1997. p. 341. The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.
  27. "Subtitle B—Criminal Alien Provisions: Sec. 321. Amended Definition of Aggravated Felony" (PDF). IIRIRA. U.S. Congress. p. 629. (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall apply to actions taken on or after the date of the enactment of [IIRIRA], regardless of when the conviction occurred.... (emphases added)
  28. See, e.g.,
    • "INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 25, 2001. p. 320.
    • "Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (2012)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. March 28, 2012. p. 261.
      • "Francisco-Lopez v. Attorney General, 970 F.3d 431". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 13, 2020. p. 436. Retroactivity is not favored in the law. This applies with full force to the BIA's retroactive application of new law.
      • "Lopez v. Sessions, 901 F.3d 1071". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 22, 2018. p. 1077. [T]he structure and text of the statute indicate that the fact of conviction (not the underlying conduct) is the relevant transaction for purposes of the retroactivity analysis.
      • "Jaghoori v. Holder, 772 F.3d 764". Fourth Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 18, 2014. p. 769. Although we generally defer to agency interpretations of statutes that are ambiguous, 'a statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed ... to be unambiguously prospective.'
      • "Jeudy v. Holder, 768 F.3d 595". Seventh Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 15, 2014. p. 605. Applying § 1229b(d)(l)(B) in this case would impose a new disability on pre-IIRIRA conduct without a clear statement from Congress indicating its intent to impose that disability. We therefore hold that Jeudy's 1995 drug conviction did not 'stop time' for his continuous residence in the United States.
      • "Zivkovic v. Holder, 724 F.3d 894". Seventh Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 31, 2013. p. 911. Because Zivkovic's aggravated felony convictions were more than a decade old before the 1988 statute took effect, they cannot be used as a ground for removal (although they can be used for many other purposes under the statute).
      • "Ledezma-Galicia v. Holder, 636 F.3d 1059". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 29, 2010. p. 1080. Ledezma-Galicia is not removable by reason of being an aggravated felon, because 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) does not apply to convictions, like Ledezma-Galicia's, that occurred prior to November 18, 1988.
      • "Sinotes-Cruz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1190". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 22, 2006. p. 1192. We also hold... that the permanent stop-time rule of § 240A(d)(l) ... may not be applied retroactively to prevent Sinotes-Cruz from fulfilling the sevenyear continuous residence requirement ... for cancellation of removal.
  29. "Matter of Abdelghany, 26 I&N Dec. 254" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. February 28, 2014.
  30. "NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929 (2017)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. March 21, 2017. p. 939. The ordinary meaning of 'notwithstanding' is 'in spite of,' or 'without prevention or obstruction from or by.'
    • "Make The Road New York v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612". D.C. Circuit. Casetext.com. June 23, 2020. p. 631 n.13. It is well established 'that the specific governs the general.'
    • "Perez-Guzman v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1066". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 31, 2016. p. 1075. When two statutes come into conflict, courts assume Congress intended specific provisions to prevail over more general ones....
    • "United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720". Fifth Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 18, 1972. p. 722. Moreover, where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.
  32. "Levesque v. Lynch, 802 F.3d 152". First Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 18, 2015. p. 155.
  33. "Deprivation of rights under color of law". U.S. Dept. of Justice. Section 242 of Title 18 makes it a crime for a person acting under color of any law to willfully deprive a person of a right or privilege protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. For the purpose of Section 242, acts under 'color of law' include acts not only done by federal, state, or local officials within their lawful authority, but also acts done beyond the bounds of that official's lawful authority, if the acts are done while the official is purporting to or pretending to act in the performance of his/her official duties. Persons acting under color of law within the meaning of this statute include police officers, prisons guards and other law enforcement officials, as well as judges, care providers in public health facilities, and others who are acting as public officials....
  34. "United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. March 31, 1997. p. 264. Section 242 is a Reconstruction Era civil rights statute making it criminal to act (1) 'willfully' and (2) under color of law (3) to deprive a person of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
    • "Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 27, 2002. p. 739. Officers sued in a civil action for damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 have the same right to fair notice as do defendants charged with the criminal offense defined in 18 U. S. C. §242.
      • "United States v. Acosta, 470 F.3d 132". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 30, 2006. p. 136. Section 241 proscribes conspiracies that seek to 'injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person' in connection with exercising or enjoying constitutional rights.
  35. Michelle Leigh Carter, Giving Taxpatriates the Boot, Permanently: The Reed Amendment Unconstitutionally Infringes on the Fundamental Right to Expatriate, 36 Ga. L. Rev. 835 (2002).
  36. "Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 28, 2001. p. 682. Based on our conclusion that indefinite detention of aliens in the former category would raise serious constitutional concerns, we construe the statute to contain an implicit 'reasonable time' limitation, the application of which is subject to federal-court review.
  37. "Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. February 27, 2018. p. 836. (plurality opinion)
  38. "Subtitle B—Criminal Alien Provisions: Sec. 322. Definition of Conviction and Term of Imprisonment" (PDF). IIRIRA. U.S. Congress. p. 630. (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall apply to convictions and sentences entered before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act. Subparagraphs (B) and (C) of [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)] shall apply to proving such convictions. (emphases added)
  39. "McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. May 28, 2013. p. 392. [A] credible showing of actual innocence may allow a prisoner to pursue his constitutional claims (here, ineffective assistance of counsel) on the merits notwithstanding the existence of a procedural bar to relief.
    • "United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 26, 1993. p. 736. The court of appeals should no doubt correct a plain forfeited error that causes the conviction or sentencing of an actually innocent defendant....
      • "Howell v. Superintendent Albion SCI, 978 F.3d 54". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. October 21, 2020. p. 59. The overarching question in this case is whether Howell has made a sufficient showing of actual innocence to gain relief under Rule 60(b)(6) – relief that would serve as a gateway past the procedural default of his having untimely filed his habeas petition, thus allowing the petition to be considered.
      • "In re Bressman, 874 F.3d 142". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. October 18, 2017. p. 149. Rule 60 has no applicability where, as here, a party requests relief from a final judgment in response to an opponent's alleged fraud on the court.
      • "Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. February 13, 2014. p. 1134. A federal habeas petitioner can overcome a procedural default, including a failure to comply with the statute of limitations, by demonstrating actual innocence of the crime underlying his conviction.
      • "Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. February 28, 2011. p. 1047. A petitioner is actually innocent when he was convicted for conduct not prohibited by law.
  40. "Tanzin v. Tanvir, 141 S. Ct. 486 (2020)". U.S. Supreme Court. Casetext.com. December 10, 2020. p. 492. A damages remedy is not just 'appropriate' relief as viewed through the lens of suits against Government employees. It is also the only form of relief that can remedy some RFRA violations.
  41. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) ("Judicial review ... is governed only by chapter 158 of title 28, except as provided in subsection (b)....") (emphasis added)
    • 28 U.S.C. § 2344 ("The petition shall contain a concise statement of—(1) the nature of the proceedings as to which review is sought; (2) the facts on which venue is based; (3) the grounds on which relief is sought; and (4) the relief prayed.") (emphasis added)
  42. "Child Citizenship Act of 2000 ('CCA'), Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631 (2000)" (PDF). U.S. Congress. October 30, 2000. pp. 1633–36.
  43. "Subtitle A—Revision of Procedures for Removal of Aliens: Sec. 304. Removal Proceedings..." (PDF). IIRIRA. U.S. Congress. p. 588-89.
  44. See, e.g.,
    • "Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021)". U.S. Supreme Court. Casetext.com. April 29, 2021. p. 1478. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009–546, requires the government to serve 'a notice to appear' on individuals it wishes to remove from this country. At first blush, a notice to appear might seem to be just that—a single document containing all the information an individual needs to know about his removal hearing.
    • "Johnson v. Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271 (2021)". U.S. Supreme Court. Casetext.com. June 29, 2021. p. 2280. That notice informs the alien of, among other things, the charges against him and the time and place of the hearing at which an immigration judge will determine whether the alien is to be removed.
      • "Naizhu Jiang v. Garland, ___ F.4th ___, No. 19-1911". Second Circuit. Casetext.com. November 24, 2021. p. 1.
      • "Orozco-Velasquez v. Attorney General, 817 F.3d 78". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 11, 2016. p. 84. A Notice to Appear is not meant to be enigmatic. Its purpose is to provide an alien with notice—of the charges against him and the basic contours of the proceedings to come.
      • "Cantor v. Garland, ___ F.4th ___, No. 19-73085". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. November 3, 2021. p. 4. [T]he stop-time rule applies to only the two circumstances set out in the statute, and a final order of removal satisfies neither.
        • "Matter of M-F-O-, 28 I&N Dec. 408". Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. November 4, 2021. p. 416. Accordingly, the court reasoned that a respondent accrues physical presence for purposes of section 240B(b)(1)(A) from the moment he enters the United States until he is served with a single document providing him with all the information required by section 239(a) of the Act. We agree with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and will apply it nationwide.
  45. See, e.g.,
    • "Choeum v. INS, 129 F.3d 29". First Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 5, 1997. p. 38. At the core of these due process rights is the right to notice of the nature of the charges and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
    • "Pierre v. Holder, 588 F.3d 767". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 8, 2009. p. 776. We further conclude that the BIA's sua sponte invocation of subsection U as a basis for finding Pierre removable as an aggravated felon under section 237(a)(2) (A) (iii) of the INA violated Pierre's due process rights.
    • "Rodriguez v. Attorney General, 844 F.3d 392". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 19, 2016. p. 399. Essential to the due process rights of a noncitizen permanent resident is that 'before his expulsion[,] he is entitled to notice of the nature of the charge and a hearing at least before an executive or administrative tribunal.'
    • "Lazaro v. Mukasey, 527 F.3d 977". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. June 4, 2008. pp. 979–81.
  46. See, e.g.,
    • "Hirsch v. INS, 308 F.2d 562". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 10, 1962. p. 567. The evidence upon which the Board relied was irrelevant; that on which the hearing officer relied is insufficient to support the charges made. Accordingly, it is determined that the order of deportation is invalid, and the order is set aside.
    • "Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 9, 2003. p. 884-85.
  47. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added)
    • 8 CFR 1240.8(a) ("A respondent charged with deportability shall be found to be removable if the Service proves by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is deportable as charged.")
    • 8 CFR 1240.46(a) ("A determination of deportability shall not be valid unless it is found by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true.")
      • "Rumierz v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 31". First Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 3, 2006. p. 36. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a provides that the burden of proof is on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that, in the case of an alien who has been lawfully admitted to the United States, the alien is deportable.
      • "Francis v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 131". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 27, 2006. p. 138. In this case, however, because Francis is a permanent resident, the government bears the burden of proof, which it must meet by adducing 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true.'
      • "Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. April 6, 1990. p. 670 n.7. The Supreme Court has held that the burden of proof is upon the INS to show the facts supporting deportability by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.
      • "United States v. Thompson-Riviere, 561 F.3d 345". Fourth Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 26, 2009. p. 349. To convict him of this offense, the government bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (inter alia) he is an 'alien,'
      • "Ward v. Holder, 733 F.3d 601". Sixth Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 15, 2013. p. 605. In addition to the Ninth Circuit and our Circuit, the First, and the Fifth Circuits have faced the same fact pattern and have held that the government must prove inadmissibility by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.
      • "Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 15, 2015. p. 417. We ... hold that 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing' is the familiar intermediate standard used in civil cases when particularly important individual interests are at stake.
        • "Matter of Pichardo, 21 I&N Dec. 330" (PDF). Board of Immigration Appeals. U.S. Dept. of Justice. April 23, 1996. p. 333. In fact, this conviction may support a finding of deportability under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act, but only if the record contains clear, unequivocal, and convincing proof that possession of a firearm was an integral element of the offense that the respondent was convicted of committing.... In other words, the evidence of record must establish that the respondent was, in fact, convicted of criminally possessing a firearm within the meaning of section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act.
  48. See, e.g.,
    • "Berenyi v. District Director, INS, 385 U.S. 630 (1967)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. January 23, 1967. p. 636. When the Government seeks to strip a person of citizenship already acquired, or deport a resident alien and send him from our shores, it carries the heavy burden of proving its case by 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.' (footnotes omitted)
    • "Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. December 12, 1966. p. 286. We hold that no deportation order may be entered unless it is found by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true.
    • "Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. November 14, 1960. pp. 353–56.
    • "Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. February 9, 1953. p. 596-97. It is well established that if an alien is a lawful permanent resident of the United States and remains physically present there, he is a person within the protection of the Fifth Amendment. He may not be deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process of law. (emphasis added)
    • "Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. June 18, 1945. p. 149. [D]etention under an invalid order of deportation is established where an alien is ordered deported for reasons not specified by Congress.
  49. "Medina-Lara v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1106". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. October 10, 2014. p. 1119. The government has failed to carry its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that Medina has been convicted of an aggravated felony or a controlled substance offense. Similarly, Supreme Court case law issued subsequent to the agency action reviewed here has foreclosed on the government's contention that Medina had been convicted of a firearm offense.
  50. "United States v. Aguilera-Rios, 769 F.3d 626". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. June 17, 2014. p. 629.
  51. "United States v. Ochoa, 861 F.3d 1010". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 3, 2017. p. 1013.
  52. "Subtitle A—Revision of Procedures for Removal of Aliens" (PDF). IIRIRA. U.S. Congress. p. 596-97.
  53. "Subtitle A—Revision of Procedures for Removal of Aliens: Sec. 305. Detention and Removal of Aliens Ordered Removed..." (PDF). IIRIRA. U.S. Congress. p. 603.
  54. "INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. May 3, 1999. p. 420.
      • "Luziga v. Attorney General, 937 F.3d 244". Third Circuit. Casetext.com. September 5, 2019. p. 251-52. Withholding of removal is a mandatory form of relief that prevents removal of a noncitizen to a country where that individual's life or freedom would be threatened because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. (emphasis added)
  55. "Subtitle A—Revision of Procedures for Removal of Aliens: Sec. 306. Appeals From Orders of Removal..." (PDF). IIRIRA. U.S. Congress. pp. 608–613.
  56. "E.O.H.C. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. February 13, 2020. p. 188. Sections 1252(a)(4) and (a)(2)(B)(ii) do not bar review of appellants' nonrefoulement claim.
  57. "Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. November 2, 2004. p. 1120. Persecution may be emotional or psychological, as well as physical.
  58. "City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 740 F.3d 379 (1985)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. July 1, 1985. p. 439. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.
  59. "Subtitle A—Revision of Procedures for Removal of Aliens" (PDF). IIRIRA. U.S. Congress. p. 613. (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), the amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) shall apply to all final orders of deportation or removal and motions to reopen filed on or after the date of the enactment of [IIRIRA].... (emphases added)
  60. "Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386 (1995)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 19, 1995. p. 405. This is all the more true of statutory provisions specifying the timing of review, for those time limits are, as we have often stated, 'mandatory and jurisdictional,' Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U. S. 33, 45 (1990), and are not subject to equitable tolling.
  61. "Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago, 138 S. Ct. 13 (2017)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. November 8, 2017. p. 17. 'Only Congress may determine a lower federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction.'
    • "Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. April 18, 1990. p. 45. We deal first with the question of our own jurisdiction. Title 28 U. S. C. § 2101(c) requires that a petition for certiorari in a civil case be filed within 90 days of the entry of the judgment below. This 90-day limit is mandatory and jurisdictional. We have no authority to extend the period for filing except as Congress permits. (emphasis added)
  62. "Afanwi v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 788". Fourth Circuit. Harvard Law School. May 19, 2008. p. 793. This argument misreads Stone, for that decision, closely read, does not require that a petitioner must, in all circumstances, file a separate petition for review for each order.
  63. "Cheneau v. Garland, No. 15-70636". Ninth Circuit. Casetext.com. May 18, 2021. p. 3. Cheneau is a citizen of the United States. Accordingly, we GRANT the petition for review, VACATE the BIA's decision, and REMAND with instructions to terminate Cheneau's removal proceedings.
  64. "Singh v. USCIS, 878 F.3d 441". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 22, 2017. p. 443. The government conceded that Singh's removal was improper given the Ninth Circuit's stay. Consequently, in May 2007, Singh was temporarily paroled back into the United States by the Attorney General, who exercised his discretion to grant temporary-parole to certain aliens.
    • "Orabi v. Attorney General, 738 F.3d 535". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. January 2, 2014. p. 543. The judgment of the BIA will therefore be reversed, with instructions that the Government, pursuant to its August 12, 2013 letter, be directed to return Orabi to the United States in accordance with the ICE regulations cited.
      • "Avalos-Palma v. United States, Civil Action No. 13-5481(FLW)". U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. Casetext.com. July 16, 2014. p. 3. On June 2, 2012, approximately 42 months after the improper deportation, ICE agents effectuated Avalos-Palma's return to the United States.
        • "In re Vikramjeet Sidhu, A044 238 062". Board of Immigration Appeals. Scribd. November 30, 2011. pp. 1–2. As related in his brief on appeal, the respondent was physically removed from the United States in June 2004, but subsequently returned to this country under a grant of humanitarian parole.... Accordingly, the proceedings will be terminated.
  65. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) ("Requirements for review of orders of removal") (emphasis added)
  66. "Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. January 26, 2004. p. 534. It is well established that when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms. (quotation marks omitted)
  67. FRAP 26(b)(2) ("For good cause, the court may extend the time prescribed by these rules or by its order to perform any act, or may permit an act to be done after that time expires. But the court may not extend the time to file... a petition to enjoin, set aside, suspend, modify, enforce, or otherwise review an order of an administrative agency, board, commission, or officer of the United States, unless specifically authorized by law.) (emphases added)
    • "García v. Lynch, 821 F.3d 178". First Circuit. Harvard Law School. May 9, 2016. p. 180. Congress has imposed statutorily prescribed time limits on parties seeking judicial review of final agency orders in immigration cases... compliance with these time limits is mandatory and jurisdictional.
    • "Malvoisin v. INS, 268 F.3d 74". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. October 3, 2001. pp. 75–76. When a petition is filed late, 'we have no authority to consider' it.... Athough our precedents on this issue addressed an earlier statute with a more generous deadline, 'the [new] reduced time period does not change the jurisdictional nature of the statutory requirement.'
    • "McAllister v. Attorney General, 444 F.3d 178". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. April 10, 2006. p. 185. Because the petition for review was filed more than thirty days after the BIA's August 4, 2004, final order, the petition was untimely. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to review this decision by the BIA, and we will dismiss Nicola and Sean's appeals.
    • "Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117". Fourth Circuit. Harvard Law School. February 16, 2011. p. 122.
    • "Navarro-Miranda v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 672". Fifth Circuit. Harvard Law School. May 6, 2003. p. 676. An alien has thirty days from the date of the final order of removal to file a petition for review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (2000). This deadline is jurisdictional. Guirguis v. INS, 993 F.2d 508, 509 (5th Cir.1993).
    • "Prekaj v. INS, 384 F.3d 265". Sixth Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 8, 2004. p. 267-68.
    • "Chavarria-Reyes v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 275". Seventh Circuit. Harvard Law School. December 30, 2016. p. 277. The Supreme Court has characterized a predecessor statute as jurisdictional... and we held ... that the current version also is jurisdictional.
    • "Liadov v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 1003". Eight Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 14, 2008. p. 1006 n.2.
    • "Magtanong v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 1190". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. July 23, 2007. p. 1191.
    • "Nahatchevska v. Ashcroft, 317 F.3d 1226". Tenth Circuit. Harvard Law School. January 29, 2003. p. 1227. The filing of a timely petition for review is 'mandatory and jurisdictional; and is 'not subject to equitable tolling.'
    • "Lin v. Attorney General, 677 F.3d 1043". Eleventh Circuit. Harvard Law School. April 17, 2012. p. 1045.
  69. See, e.g.,
    • "Kolkevich v. Attorney General, 501 F.3d 323". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. September 6, 2007. p. 336. We further hold that the 30-day time limit in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) should not be interpreted as applying to those aliens who received final orders of removal prior to the enactment of RIDA, but who did not file a petition for review directly in a court of appeals until after the enactment of RIDA....
  70. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall enjoin the removal of any alien pursuant to a final order under this section unless the alien shows by clear and convincing evidence that the entry or execution of such order is prohibited as a matter of law.") (emphasis added)
    • Justice Alito, dissenting, ed. (April 22, 2009). "Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009)". U.S. Supreme Court. Harvard Law School. p. 443. [T]he context surrounding IIRIRA's enactment suggests that § 1252(f)(2) was an important—not a superfluous—statutory provision.
      • "Alli v. Decker, 650 F.3d 1007". Third Circuit. Harvard Law School. June 21, 2011. p. 1016. [W]e conclude that construing § 1252(f)(1) to permit class declaratory relief would not produce an 'absurd result.'
      • "Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. June 18, 2001. p. 482. The INS suggests that construing § 1252(f)(2) in light of other provisions in the statute is contrary to the statute's command that § 1252(f)(2) applies '[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.' But this phrase cannot be sensibly read as foreclosing resort to other sections of the statute in an attempt to determine the meaning of the term 'enjoin.' Rather, the phrase means that § 1252(f)(2)'s standard for granting injunctive relief in removal proceedings trumps any contrary provision elsewhere in the law.
  71. "Sec. 701. Reconsidering and Reopening Immigration Cases" (PDF). New Way Forward Act. U.S. Congress. pp. 25–28.
  72. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5); "Johnson v. Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271 (2021)". U.S. Supreme Court. Casetext.com. June 29, 2021. p. 2282.
  73. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(2)
  74. See, e.g.,
  75. See, e.g.,
    • "Bibiano v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 966". Ninth Circuit. Harvard Law School. August 19, 2016. p. 969. We join the noncontroversial holding—shared by the nine other circuits which have addressed this issue in detail—that § 1252(b)(2)'s venue provision is not jurisdictional.
    • "United States v. Calderon, 243 F.3d 587". Second Circuit. Harvard Law School. March 1, 2001. p. 590. Venue is not jurisdictional....
  76. "Rule 20. Procedure on a Petition for an Extraordinary Writ". Legal Information Institute. Retrieved 2021-11-27.
  77. http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/news/factsheets/060816dc287gfactsheet.pdf Archived September 25, 2006, at the Wayback Machine
  78. Zezima, Katie (December 13, 2006). "Massachusetts Set for Its Officers to Enforce Immigration Law". New York Times.
  79. Pérez, Zenen Jaimes (2014). Removing Barriers to Higher Education for Undocumented Students (PDF). Center for American Progress.
  80. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Public Law 104-208, 104th Cong. 1st sess. (September 30, 1996).
  81. 18 U.S.C. § 611
  82. Wang, Julia Shu-Huah; Kaushal, Neeraj (April 2018). "Health and Mental Health Effects of Local Immigration Enforcement". NBER Working Paper No. 24487. doi:10.3386/w24487.

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