Brazilian military junta of 1930

On 19 October, the popular Cardinal Sebastião Leme, archbishop of Rio de Janeiro,[9] arrived in the capital from Rome. Two days earlier, Cavalcanti had convinced him that, in the interest of peace, he should procure Luís's resignation. When Leme proposed his resignation, the president replied, "What! Then Your Eminence doubts the loyalty of my generals!"[10]

Many generals believed the president's continued stubbornness was useless, and they feared a civil war. Augusto Tasso Fragoso, former Army Chief of Staff, had told former Rio Grande do Sul deputy Lindolfo Collor that he may join the revolution if it became nationwide.[11][12] Though Fragoso stated his opposition to the armed overthrow of constitutional authorities, he said he would "take the attitude which his patriotism indicated."[13] After attending Mass for a general killed in Paraíba, he told General João de Deus Mena Barreto that a rebellion in Rio seemed imminent. Mena Barreto was being urged by his Chief of Staff Colonel Bertoldo Klinger, on behalf of a group of young officers, to intervene to end the hostilities in a military coup favorable to revolutionaries. Concerned about the military hierarchy, Mena Barreto suggested Tasso Fragoso, the most senior officer, head the movement. When he refused, he asked Army Chief of Staff Alexandre Henrique Xavier Leal, who also refused. Finally, on the morning of 23 October, one of Mena Barreto's sons convinced Tasso Fragoso to take charge.[11][13]

Mena Barreto told Klinger to give the president an ultimatum. Many were reluctant to sign it, but Klinger received approval from key members of the Army's general staff. What was being proposed was a "pacification coup." Tasso Fragoso reworded Klinger's document to make it seem like more of an appeal to the president. Tasso Fragoso, Mena Barreto, and their associates convened on the night of 23 October at Fort Copacabana to make plans for the ousting, having received assurance of support from the military police and the outlying barracks at Vila Militar.[11]

Washington Luís (pictured 1926)

The operation which would depose the President was initiated on the morning of 24 October.[11][14] Before dawn, the Minister of War and commander of the 1st Military Region came to talk with Luís, and, just from their faces, it became clear the situation was unsustainable and irreversible. Shortly before 9 a.m., Leme called to speak with Minister of Foreign Affairs Otávio Mangabeira that he had been told Fort Copacabana ordered the President leave by 11 a.m., and, as a warning, they would begin shooting dry powder after 9 a.m. Luís determined his wife and other ladies in the Guanabara Palace, Luís's residence, would evacuate and seek shelter in their friends' house in Cosme Velho. Shots of dry powder began as they left, scaring the entire population of Rio.[11][13]

Klinger's appeal, signed by the generals, appeared early in the press. Consequently, mobs were soon enthusiastically setting fire to pro-government newspapers. Meanwhile, rebel troops were moved from the regiment at Praia Vermelha to the Guanabara Palace. The movement was only hindered by crowds of armed civilians hoping to join the march. The President gathered those present and allowed them to leave, but none did, sticking by his side. Though the President was told he could count on 2,600 soldiers, the police brigade defending the Guanabara Palace chose not to resist. Tasso Fragoso and Mena Barreto, as well as Alfredo Malan d'Angrogne, entered. They found the President, who got up to speak with them, sitting solemnly in a small, gloomy room, surrounded by his cabinet, sons, a few friends, and congressmen, in the distance taunting cries of the crowd outside.[11][13][15]

According to historian John W. F. Dulles, "The President remained every inch the proud man who would fulfill his duty as he saw it."[11] "Only in pieces I leave here," the President said to his ministers.[16] He said there were still soldiers to defend his government. He was completely mistaken, and Tasso Fragoso later explained, "No one wanted his son to put on a uniform and die fighting a man frankly divorced from the common interest."[16][17] After bowing, Tasso Fragoso offered Luís his life, to which the President proclaimed, in a firm and dry tone, "The last thing I cherish at a time like this is my life. My blood will soak the soil so that a better Brazil may emerge, a true national regeneration."[18] After Luís refused to resign and tensions climaxed, the General replied, "Your Excellency will be responsible for the consequences," to which Luís accepted.[18][19] Bowing again, Tasso Fragoso left.[18]

That afternoon, Cardinal Leme, calling on the President at Tasso Fragoso's request, told him the generals had established their provisional government junta on the first floor of the Guanabara Palace. He used his influence with Luís to ease him out of office in safety. Noting the ugly mood of the crowd, Leme said Fort Copacabana would be the safest place for the President, and he was able to get the generals to agree that he would be allowed to set sail for Europe without delay. Those who were by his side concurred, and at 5 p.m., he agreed and was driven to Fort Copacabana. In the presidential limousine with Luís were Leme, Tasso Fragoso, and several others. The President explained to Leme, "Since this morning, I have been a prisoner in this room, with the palace and gardens invaded by troops. I leave, bowing to violence."[18][13][20]

From left: Noronha, Fragoso, and Barreto, the three members of the junta.

Fragoso, head of the junta,[18] Barreto, and Noronha declared themselves a ruling body, claiming to exist as a "pacifying junta" with a "moderating power",[21][7] despite the fact that the territory they controlled was limited to Rio de Janeiro.[22] Initially, the generals attempted to remain in power, appointing a new minister of war (Leite de Castro), chief of police (Betolodo Klinger), and military governor of São Paulo (Hastínfilo de Moura).[23] Klinger told the press on 28 October that "the false rumor that the Governing Junta will be summarily replaced and will turn over the reins of government to Getúlio Vargas" was ungrounded.[24]

The revolutionaries were caught off guard by the sudden nature of the coup, having been given no notice. During the revolution, a major rebel offensive was supposed to occur on the Paraná–São Paulo border but was delayed due to bad weather from 20—24 October.[25] However, the attack, already in progress by 25 October, was called off when the rebels heard of the coup in the capital.[25][14] Refusing to recognize the junta, Távora proceeded to lead his troops into Salvador, Bahia's capital.[26] Vargas, in charge of the revolution, telegraphed on 24 October that the members of the junta would be "accepted as collaborators and not directors," that they "joined the revolution at the time when its success was assured," and that he would listen to any proposals the junta had before setting out for São Paulo the next day.[23][25] The junta responded on 27 October, declaring that they would await the arrival of Vargas for any further action to be taken in arranging the government.[25] Several more messages would be exchanged between Vargas and the junta.[27]

The junta's attempts at consolidating power proved unsuccessful, however; due to popular demonstration, increasing pressure from troops entering the capital, and the opposition of Vargas, the government held talks with Távora, Collor, and Oswaldo Aranha on 28 October to arrange a new government.[28][29][14][21][22][26] The latter, Aranha, proclaimed in a message to the junta on 28 October that revolutionaries could not "stop in the middle of the road".[26] Additionally, Governor Moura was very unpopular, with backlash towards him being so high that protests erupted in São Paulo, leading to him leaving office on 28 October.[30][23] Klinger's statement to the press, made while talks were being held with Aranha, was also overriden by the junta itself, confirming the junta would hand over the government to Vargas.[24]

• Abreu, Alzira Alves de. "Revolução de 1930". FGV CPDOC. Retrieved 7 October 2021.
• Bourne, Richard (1974). Getulio Vargas of Brazil, 1883—1954 Sphinx of the Pampas. London, England: C. Knight. ISBN 978-0-85314-195-2.
• Dulles, John W.F. (2012). Vargas of Brazil: A Political Biography. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press. ISBN 978-0-292-74078-5.
• Fausto, Boris; Fausto, Sergio (2014). A Concise History of Brazil (Second ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9-781-107-63524-1.
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• Levine, Robert M.; Crocitti, John J. (1999). The Brazil reader: history, culture, politics. Duke University Press. ISBN 978-0-822-32290-0.
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• Reid, Michael (2014). Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-16560-9.
• Ribeiro, Antônio Sérgio (21 October 2005). "Revolução de 1930: 75 anos". Assembleia Legislativa do Estado de São Paulo. Retrieved 5 May 2021.
• Roett, Riordan (1992). Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society; Fourth Edition. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.
• Skidmore, Thomas E. (1999). Brazil: Five Centuries of Change. United States: Oxford University Press.
• Skidmore, Thomas E. (2010). Brazil: Five Centuries of Change (2º ed.). United States: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-537455-1.
• Skidmore, Thomas E. (2007). Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964. New York, New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-533269-8.
• Young, Jordan M. (1964). "Military Aspects of the 1930 Brazilian Revolution". Hispanic American Historical Review. 44 (2): 180–196 – via Duke University Press.
• Young, Jordan M. (1967). The Brazilian revolution of 1930 and the aftermath. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.